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INTRODUCTION
Society is obsessed with time. We count down the number of
shopping days until Christmas.' Days are measured in billable
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1. James Barron, Turkey and Stuffing? Yawn. We're Jumping Ahead to
Christmas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at B3.
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hours.2 We invest based on the time value of money.3 Children are
punished by time outs.4 People struggle with time management,
5
6
worrying that if they waste time, time will doth waste them. We
want time to stand still when we are having the time of our lives
because we know that as time goes by, the times will be a-
changin'. 7 We believe there is a time for everything.8 In sum, we
are buried by the sands of time.
But as cognizant as we are of time in our day-to-day lives, we
remain ignorant of how time affects our legal rights, especially our
right to file suit. 9 Legal time mismanagement is particularly
prevalent in Louisiana in part because of the doctrine of
peremption. Peremption, as defined in the Louisiana Civil Code, is
"a period of time fixed by law for the existence of a right." ° In
other words, it is a mode of destroying rights due to their nonuse.
Though seemingly simple in definition, peremption creates vast
jurisprudential problems. First, peremption causes inequities in the
law. Because peremption abolishes a right after a fixed, absolute
time period, a claimant's cause of action may be extinguished
before the claimant even knows he can bring the cause of action.
The loss of rights under such circumstances effectively denies the
claimant his opportunity to file suit. This ostensibly unfair result
leads to the second problem of peremption, the misapplication of
2. See generally Stephen W. Jones & Melissa Beard Glover, The Attack on
Traditional Billing Practices, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 293, 293-97
(1998) (recounting the history of law firms charging clients by billable hours).
3. DAvID R. HERWITZ & MATrHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING FOR
LAWYERS 205-06 (4th ed. 2006).
4. See Hewitt B. Clark et al., Timeout as a Punishing Stimulus in
Continuous and Intermittent Schedules, 6 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 443
(1973).
5. ALEX MACKENZIE, THE TIME TRAP: THE CLASSIC BOOK ON TIME
MANAGEMENT 4 (3d ed. 1997).
6. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act 2, sc. 5.
7. See, e.g., THE ALL-AMERICAN REJECTS, TIME STANDS STILL
(Dreamworks Records 2003); CASABLANCA: ORIGINAL MOTION PICTURE
SOUNDTRACK, As TIME GOES BY (Rhino/Wea 1997); BOB DYLAN, THE TIMES
THEY ARE A-CHANGIN' (Columbia Records 1964); GREEN DAY, GOOD
RIDDANCE [TIME OF YOUR LIFE] (Reprise 1997).
8. Ecclesiastes 3:1-8.
9. In a 2006 American Bar Association presentation, one of the
predominant reasons cited for clients filing legal malpractice claims against their
attorney is because the attorney missed deadlines. See Mark C.S.
Bassingthwaighte & Reba J, Nance, Presentation at the ABA Tech Show 2006:
The Top Ten Causes of Malpractice-and How You Can Avoid Them 2 (Apr.
20-22, 2006), http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/tch12062.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2010).
10. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3458 (2007).
11. See infra Part II.A.
1180 [Vol. 70
PROBLEM WITH PEREMPTION
the doctrine. 12 Some courts (and occasionally the legislature) are
unwilling to promulgate the aforementioned inequities of
peremption; instead, they attempt to provide equitable remedies to
claimants.11 To do so, however, courts and the legislature apply-
or, more accurately, misapply-rules inapposite to the underlying
principles of peremption to peremptive periods.14  Such
misapplications further the third problem of the doctrine: confusion
between peremption and other temporal doctrines. 15 Classifying
whether a time period is peremptive has been an arduous task since
the creation of the institution. 6 This difficulty lies largely in the
doctrine's facial similarity to prescription, another institution that
terminates litigation due to the passage of time.' 7 The non-
peremptive rules misapplied to peremptive periods are frequently
rules of prescription.' As prescriptive rules are applied to
peremptive periods, the differences between the two doctrines
become blurred, thus making distinguishing peremption from
prescription more onerous and, in turn, increasing the confusion of
courts as to how to characterize particular time limitations.
Because of these issues, this Article argues that the laws
pertaining to peremption are in need of vast legislative overhaul.
Part I details the history and definition of peremption. Part II
delineates the current problems with peremption, describing the
inequities it creates, the misapplications of the doctrine, and the
confusion courts face when determining whether a time limitation
is peremptive. Part III suggests four alternative legislative
solutions for peremption, explains how each solution alleviates the
current problems, and discusses the solutions' advantages and
disadvantages. This Article concludes by advocating for a
particular legislative remedy.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF PEREMPTION
The history, definition, and effects of peremption shed light on
many of the institution's current problems. Given the close relation
12. See infra Part ll.B.
13. Seeid.
14. See id.
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. See id.
17. There are three types of prescription in Louisiana: acquisitive,
liberative, and nonuse. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3445 (2007). Unless otherwise
stated, prescription in this Article refers to liberative prescription. Liberative
prescription in Louisiana is "a mode of barring... actions as a result of inaction
for a period of time." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3447 (2007).
18. See infra Part II.B.
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of peremption to prescription, however, these matters must be
understood not only within the confines of peremption, but also as
they compare to and contrast with prescription.
A. History of Peremption
The origins of peremption are rooted in the doctrine of
liberative prescription. 19 Prescription was originally introduced in
Roman law by the praetor 0 as an equitable means of temporally
19. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Flowers, Inc. v. Rausch that
"peremption is but a form or prescription, a species thereof." 364 So. 2d 928,
931 (1978). In that same decision, the court proclaimed that "peremption is a
common law term which has crept into our jurisprudence." Id at 931 n. 1. This
statement is dubious at best. The first Louisiana case establishing the doctrine of
peremption cited French authorities to support its use of peremption. See
Shepherd v. Orleans Cotton Press Co., 2 La. Ann. 100, 105 (La. 1847) (citing
French scholar Troplong and the Code Napoleon). The only early Louisiana case
utilizing peremption that cited common law authorities was Guillory v.
Avoyelles Railroad Co. See 28 So. 899, 901 (La. 1900). Though the Guillory
court cited two common law cases that discussed the extinguishment of rights
under a "strict" application of the statute of limitations, neither court used the
term "peremption." See Taylor v. Cranberry Iron & Coal Co., 94 N.C. 525, 527
(N.C. 1886); Cooper v. Lyons, 77 Tenn. 596, 600 (Tenn. 1882). In actuality,
peremption is not a common law term. There are only a handful of cases in
common law states that use the term peremption, but none of these cases applies
peremption as a theory of extinguishing rights. See, e.g., Moore v. Estelle, 670
F.2d 56, 56 (5th Cir. 1982); HMO Ass'n v. Nicholas, 964 F. Supp. 230, 236
(E.D. Ky. 1997); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 811 F. Supp.
915, 923 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Roney v. NationsBank Corp., 799 F. Supp. 670,
672 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Hornaday v. Rowland, 674 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Alaska
1983); Morgan v. State, 635 P.2d 472, 478 (Alaska 1981); Tunley v. Anchorage
Sch. Dist., 631 P.2d 67, 71 (Alaska 1980); Dexter v. Dexter, 661 A.2d 171, 175
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Berrington v. Berrington, 633 A.2d 589, 591 n.2
(Pa. 1993). The majority of these cases mistakenly use the word "peremption"
instead of "preemption." Though similar in spelling, the two concepts differ
considerably in substance. In contract law, preemption refers to "the right to buy
before others"; in constitutional law, preemption refers to the principle "that a
federal law can supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (8th ed. 1999). Both concepts are quite
different than the concept of peremption, which extinguishes unexercised fights.
To be fair, Louisiana courts have made a similar error in the reverse by
substituting "preemption" for "peremption." See, e.g., Kimbrough v. Cooper,
915 So. 2d 344, 344 (La. 2005); Gettys v. Sessions & Fishman, L.L.P., 772 So.
2d 874, 875 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2000), writ denied, 787 So. 2d 311 (La. 2001);
Fed. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Calsim, Inc., 340 So. 2d 611, 614 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1976), writ denied, 342 So. 2d 1110 (La. 1977). Presumably the misuse of
the word "preemption" by Louisiana courts and "peremption" by American
common law courts is a typographical error.
20. In Roman law, the praetor was an executive office that had "the power
to prescribe the rules governing legal proceedings and declare the principles of
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limiting newly created actions.2 1 Through prescription, the praetor
was able to protect debtors against unreasonably delayed claims
while still providing creditors a reasonable time to file suit.22 This
equitable remedy was first codified in the Theodesian Code as a
defense to be invoked by the debtor against stale personal claims.
23
Emperor Justinian maintained the concept of prescription in the
Corpus Juris Civilis,24 and it was similarly incorporated in the
Code Napoleon of 1804,25 the Louisiana Digest of 1808,26 and the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825. 27
While equity for the debtor was the underlying motive for the
creation of prescription,28 safeguards for the creditor-such as
interruption and suspension of the prescriptive period-were
ingrained in the institution from its beginning.29 These protections
stopped the running of prescription 3when the creditor took
particular actions or was unable to act. Devices like interruption
and suspension highlighted the equitable underpinnings of the
law on the basis of which disputes were resolved." GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, A
LEGAL HISTORY OF ROME 13 (2007). To execute his powers, the praetor issued
edicts that established the principles of law and "the conditions under which [the
praetor] would allow prosecutions and suits." Id. The edicts emerged as one of
the most important sources of Roman private law. Id. at 14. For a further
discussion on the role of the praetor, see PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN
EUROPEAN HISTORY 8-12 (1999).
21. G. INST. 1.110 (A.P. Scott trans.); see W.W. BucKLAND, EQUITY IN
ROMAN LAW 56 (1911); WILLIAM A. HUNTER, A SYSTEMATIC AND HISTORICAL
EXPOSITION OF ROMAN LAW IN THE ORDER OF A CODE 646 (London, Sweet &
Maxwell, Ltd. 1897).
22. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, COMPARATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF A
EUROPEAN LAW OF SET-OFF AND PRESCRIPTION 76-79 (2002) (discussing the
balancing of interests of the creditor and debtor).
23. CODE THEOD. 4.14.1; see 2 M. PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW
pt. 1, at 347 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 11 th ed. 1959) (1939).
24. Code Just. 7.39.3 (Arcadian & Honorian 365) (A.P. Scott trans.); see
RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXT-BOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM
OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 338-40 (James Crawford Ledlie trans., Oxford 2d ed.
1901) (discussing the inclusion of prescription by Justinian).
25. Code civil [C. CIV.] art. 2219 (Fr.).
26. LA. DIG. art. 32, at 482 (1808).
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3420 (1825).
28. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 22, at 164.
29. E.g., G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & A. TISSIER, TRA1TE THEORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, PRESCRIPTION no. 466 (4th ed. 1924), reprinted in 5
CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 237 (La. State Law Inst. trans., West 1972) (noting
that Justinian allowed judicial claims to interrupt prescription).
30. Id.; PLANIOL, supra note 23, at 361-67. For a more detailed explanation
of interruption and suspension, see infra Part I.B.
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institution because they served as a defense for creditors within a
system generally designed to protect debtors.
The desire to protect the debtor, however, sometimes
outweighed the courts' interest in allowing the creditor to raise
equitable defenses. 31 In these instances, French courts classified
the statutorily Provided time period not as one of prescription, but
as a forfeiture. Forfeitures "were withdrawn from the reach of the
rules which govern[ed] prescription," meaning that the equitable
defenses prescription provided to creditors-such as interruption
and suspension-were judicially barred.33 The expiration of the
time period operated as a "foreclosure" on the creditor's right
against the debtor.34 If the creditor did not file his claim timely, his
right to sue was forfeited, regardless of the reason for his
tardiness.35
Following its French counterparts, Louisiana courts also
invoked the notion of forfeiture-referred to as peremption by
Louisiana courts36-when the need to protect the debtor exceeded
the interest in safeguarding the creditor's right to sue. Louisiana
courts first utilized the doctrine of peremption with regard to
mortgages in the mid-1800s. In the Civil Code of 1825, a mortgage
could be re-inscribed by a mortgagee to preserve its effect against
31. Actions such as the recognition of paternity and the revocation of
donations for ingratitude were deemed to be such rights. See Cour de cassation
[Cass.] May 7, 1923, D.P. 1 1923, 57 (Fr.) (recognition of paternity); Cour
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, ch. rrun, Feb. 19, 1868, S.
Jur. 111968, 171 (Fr.) (revocation of ingratitude).
32. "[C]ette limitation de la durge de I'action en revocation constituent une
simple ddchdnce ou fin de non-recevoir, et non une prescription dans le sens de
la loi." Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Metz, ch. civ., Feb. 19,
1868, S. Jur. 111868, 171 (Fr.) (describing the time period affecting the action of
revocation of a donation as the loss of a remedy and not a prescription); see also
Cour de cassation [Cass.] Feb. 11, 1925, S. Jur. 1 1925, 209 (Fr.); Cour de
cassation [Cass.] May 7, 1923, D.P. I 1923, 57 (Fr.); Cour d'appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Rouen, le ch., Aug. 5, 1863, S. Jur. 11 1863, 229 (Fr.).
Forfeitures are also referred to as dilais prefixes (strict limitations). 12 AUBRY
& RAu, DROrT CIVIL FRANQAIS, PRESCRIPTION § 771 (6th ed. 1958), reprinted in
5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 421 (La. State Law Inst. trans., West 1972); Jean
C. Carbonnier, "Notes on Liberative Prescription," 50 Revue Trimestrielle de
Droit Civil § IV (1952), reprinted in 5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 468 (La. State
Law Inst. trans., West 1972).
33. AUBRY & RAU, supra note 32, § 771, at 421; see Carbonnier, supra note
32, § IV, at 468.
34. Cour d'appel [CA] Metz, ch. civ., Feb. 19, 1868, S. Jur. 11 1868, 171
(Fr.) (describing the running of the time period for a revocation for ingratitude
as "a simple forfeiture, foreclosure of remedy").
35. Id.
36. The word "peremption" comes from the Latin word perimere meaning "to
destroy." New Orleans Warehouse Co. v. Marrero, 24 So. 800, 801 (La. 1899).
[Vol. 701184
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third parties. 37 A ten-year limitation applied to the re-inscription
such that, upon its re-inscription, a mortgage was preserved for ten
years; if the mortgage was not renewed within the given time
frame, the effect of the mortgage ceased.38 In Shepherd v. Orleans
Cotton Press Co., the claimants filed to re-inscribe their mortgage
within the applicable time period, but the filing was in improper
form. 39 The claimants argued that despite the improper form, the
filing of the re-inscription should interrupt the running of the time
limitation under the general rules of interruption of prescription.
40
The Shepherd court disagreed with the claimants' argument
and found that the time period for the re-inscription of mortgages
was a peremptive period; thus, it was not subject to the interruptive
rules of prescription.41 The Shepherd court viewed the right to re-
inscribe a mortgage as solely within the discretion of the creditor
and therefore determined that the statutorily provided time
limitation was intended to protect only the debtor.42 As the court
stated, "The inscription is exclusively in the power of the party
having an interest to make it. If he does not reinscribe he cannot
complain of losses sustained through his own neglect. ' 4h Based on
this theory, the court held that "legal delays are fatal in all cases,
unless expressly declared to be otherwise." 44 Numerous courts
subsequently adopted this view, and the time period applicable to
the re-inscription of mortgages became referred to as the
"peremption of mortgages. '
At the turn of the century, the Louisiana Supreme Court began
applying peremption to more rights. In the landmark case Guillory
v. Avoyelles Railroad Co., the court held that an action to void an
election was subject to a peremptive period of three months. 46 The
claimants in Guillory sought to nullify a tax election because of
incorrect procedures used in ordering the election.47 The election
37. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3333 (1825).
38. Id.
39. 2 La. Ann. 100, 113 (La. 1847). The form was improper because a
description of the mortgaged property was omitted from the re-inscription. Id.
40. Id. at 111.




45. See, e.g., Hyatt v. Gallier, 6 La. Ann. 321, 321 (La. 1851); Kemp v.
Rowly, 2 La. Ann. 316, 320 (La. 1847); McElrath v. Dupuy, 2 La. Ann. 520,
523 (La. 1847). For a discussion of the peremption of mortgages, see Harriet
Spiller Daggett, The Chattel Mortgage in Louisiana, 13 TUL. L. REv. 19, 39-40(1938).
46. 28 So. 899, 901 (La. 1900).
47. Id. at 900.
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occurred on July 26, 1894, but the claimants did not file suit until
April 29, 1899." The claimants argued that during the nearly five-
year span between the election and their filing, other lawsuits
regarding the election had been filed thereby interrupting what
they asserted was a prescriptive period.4 9 The claimants contended
that they had three months from the date that the last lawsuit
finished-February 6, 1899-to bring an action, i.e., they had until
May 6, 1899, to file suit.5°
The Guillory court did not accept the claimants' argument,
stating that the statute providing the right to contest an election
created a peremptive, not prescriptive, period.51 Whereas the court
in Shepherd determined that the statute was peremptive based on
who it was intended to protect, the Guillory court focused on the
language of the statute to reach its conclusion. The Guillory court
distinguished between peremption and prescription by declaring
that "[w]hen a statute creates a right of action and stipulates the
delay within which that right is to be executed, the delay thus fixed
is not properly speaking one of prescription, but it is one of
peremption."52 The court declared that "[s]tatutes of prescription
simply bar the remedy. Statutes of peremption destroy the cause of
action itself. That is to say, after the limit of time expires the cause
of action no longer exists; it is lost."53 Because the statute at issue
in Guillory provided a right to contest elections and stipulated a
three-month period for exercising that right, the limitation was
peremptive, meaning that the claimants' cause of action was
destroyed at the end of three months.
54
The reasoning the Guillory court used in determining whether a
statute created a period of peremption profoundly affected
Louisiana jurisprudence. 55 Applying the Guillory rationale that a
peremptive period was created by the stipulation of a time period
48. Id.
49. Id. The case states that the claimants argued that the other cases had the
effect of suspending prescription. Id. at 901. However, under article 3518 of the
Civil Code of 1870, the other lawsuits would have had the effect of interrupting
prescription. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3518 (1870).
50. Guillory, 28 So. at 900.
51. Id. at 901. Numerous subsequent opinions of the Louisiana Supreme
Court upheld the Guillory decision regarding the effect of the lapse of time on
the right to contest elections. See, e.g., Bone v. Sixth Ward & Crowley Drainage
Dist., 55 So. 478, 479 (La. 1911); Ark. S. R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 42 So. 976, 978
(La. 1907); Baucum v. Policy Jury of Claiborne, 44 So. 289, 290 (La. 1907).
52. Guillory, 28 So. at 901.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. James F. Shuey, Comment, Legal Rights and the Passage of Time, 41
LA. L. REv. 220,230 (1980) (describing Guillory's effect as "talismanic").
1186 [Vol. 70
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within which a right must be exercised, courts declared numerous
statutorily provided time limitations to be peremptive. By the mid-
1900s, courts concluded that an action to recover land sold at a tax
sale,56 the Workers Compensation Act,57 a revendicatory action,58
and, in some circumstances, personal injury actions59 were subject
to peremption. In all of these instances, the courts determined that
upon the lapse of the peremptive period, the underlying cause of
action was extinguished, thus leaving the claimant without further
recourse.
60
As the use of peremption by courts grew, the legislature also
began expressly incorporating the concept of peremption into
legislation.61 In doing so, however, the legislature failed to define
peremption or detail its effects. This lack of statutory definition
prompted at least one scholar to call upon the leislature to clarify
the differences in peremption and prescription. 2 The legislature
responded to this plea thirty years thereafter when the articles of
the Louisiana Civil Code pertaining to prescription were amended
63and reenacted in 1982. In the 1982 revision, four articles defming
56. Hollingsworth v. Schanland, 99 So. 613, 616 (La. 1924).
57. Heard v. Receivers of Parker Gravel Co., 194 So. 142, 144 (La. 1938);
Brister v. Wray Dickinson Co., 164 So. 415, 416 (La. 1935).
58. Canada v. Frost Lumber Indus., Inc., 9 So. 2d 338, 341 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1942).
59. Miller v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 42 So. 2d 328, 331 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1949); Smith v. Monroe Grocery Co., 171 So. 167, 171-72 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1936).
60. E.g., Brister, 164 So. at 416 (stating that upon the lapse of the
peremptive period, "the cause of action no longer existed; it was lost");
Hollingsworth, 99 So. at 616 (holding that the articles in question "should be
viewed as establishing periods of peremption rather than of prescription, and
thereafter as destroying the cause of action by the lapse of time"); Canada, 9 So.
2d at 341 (finding the claimants "forever barr[ed] from bringing their
revendicatory action").
61. For example, in Louisiana Acts number 381 of 1938, the legislature
stated that the running of the time period "shall preempt" the right. When the
legislation was placed in the Louisiana Revised Statutes, the wording was fixed
to say "perempt." See 1938 La. Acts No. 381, § 15 (now LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
34:816 (2006)) (establishing a one-year peremption period for exercising a lien
or privilege against an offending vessel). Similarly, the text of 1968 Louisiana
Acts number 105 did not use the word "peremption," but explicitly provided that
the time period could not be interrupted or suspended. When the legislation was
placed in the Revised Statutes, the heading "peremption" was added to it. See
1968 La. Acts No. 105 (now LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:147, :255 (1994)).
62. Joseph Dainow, Prescription, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1952-1953 Term, 14 LA. L. REV. 129, 132 (1953).
63. 1982 La. Acts No. 187. The amendment and reenactment of the
prescription articles were part of the continued revisions of the Civil Code and
Revised Statutes tasked to the Louisiana State Law Institute by the legislature.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:251 (2007). The general goal of the continued
20101 1187
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peremption and its effects were added to the Civil Code.64 These
articles sought to codify "concepts that [had] been agreed upon by
courts ' 65 and highlight the "existence of an underlying6 public
interest that a right exist only for a limited period of time." As the
codified version of peremption was intended to "not change the
law, 67 the definition provided in the Civil Code reflects the
definition established by Shepherd, Guillory, and their progeny.
B. Definition and Effects of Peremption
Peremption is currently defined in the Civil Code as "a period
of time fixed by law for the existence of a right."68 When the
peremptive period expires, the right is destroyed.69 Thus,
peremption is a means of precluding litigation because of the
creditor's inaction for an established period of time. As no right
exists upon the lapse of the peremptive period, there can be no
litigation beyond the established time period.
Prescription, the doctrine that gave birth to peremption, also
prevents the filing of suit as a result of the creditor's inaction.
71
Instead of extinguishing the underlying right, however,
prescription merely bars the creditor's ability to bring a cause of
action.' 2 Upon the running of prescription, the underlying right
continues to exist, but the creditor is barred from exercising that
right.73 This distinction between extinguishing rights and barring
revisions is to modernize the Civil Code. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24:204 (2007).
This being the case, it is of no surprise that peremption was added to the Civil
Code in an effort to keep the Code up-to-date with modem jurisprudence.
64. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3458-3461 (2007).
65. Marjorie Nieset Neufeld, Comment, Prescription and Peremption-The
1982 Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, 58 Tu.. L. REv. 593, 602 (1983).
66. Hebert v. Doctors Mem'l Hosp., 486 So. 2d 717, 722 (La. 1986).
67. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 3458 cmt. a, 3459 cmt. a, 3461 cmt. a
(2007).
68. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3458 (2007).
69. Id.
70. If there is no underlying right, the creditor has no cause of action,
thereby making the claim "legally nonexistent." See LA. CODE Civ. PROc. ANN.
arts. 923, 927 (2005). See generally FRANK L. MARAIST & HARRY T. LEMMON,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.7, in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 122-27 (1999)
(discussing the peremptory exception of no cause of action).
71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3447 (2007).
72. Id. "[Liberative prescription] is (very inexactly) described as extinctive
prescription. No substantive right [is] extinguished." R.W. LEE, THE ELEMENTS
OF ROMAN LAW 125 (4th ed. 1956).
73. 1 ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS CONSIDERED
IN A MORAL AND LEGAL VIEW 144 (Newbern, N.C., Martin & Ogden 1802)
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actions may appear to be one of semantics, but it represents a
fundamental distinction between peremption and prescription that
leads to dramatically different consequences regarding whether a
creditor may seek a remedy for his legal claim.74
Because a right subject to peremption only exists for a limited
period of time, the duration of a peremptive period may not be
altered. 75 As such, peremption "may not be renounced, interrupted,
or suspended.,76 Understanding how renunciation, interruption,
and suspension affect rights demonstrates why they clearly cannot
apply to peremption.
Renunciation alters the running of time limitations because it is
a mechanism by which the debtor may abandon rights that have
accrued due to the creditor's inaction. 77 If a creditor fails to sue a
debtor within the period provided by law, the debtor has gained a
right, namely the right to bar the creditor's suit. Renunciation
allows the debtor to renounce this right after the creditor's time
period has run. The concept of renunciation cannot apply to
peremption because through renunciation the debtor modifies the
time period during which the creditor's underlying right exists.
While renunciation operates as an ex-post alteration of the
creditor's ability to file suit, interruption and suspension serve as
ex-ante alterations. Interruption occurs in one of two ways: by the
creditor filing a claim or by the debtor acknowledging the debt.
78
Both manners of interruption stop the running of the time period
when the interruption occurs and restart the time period from its
beginning when the interruption ceases. 79 More simply put, the
effect of interruption is like hitting a reset button on a stopwatch:
when the interruption commences, the running of prescription
stops; when the interruption ceases, the running of prescription
restarts anew.
80
("Pleas in bar do not extinguish the claim but they render it ineffectual, in
rendering the creditor not receivable to bring the action which results from it.").
74. The Louisiana Supreme Court said that "[p]eremption differs from
prescripti[on] in two respects: (1) the expiration of the peremptive time period
destroys the cause of action itself; and (2) nothing may interfere with the
running of a peremptive time period." Naghi v. Brener, 17 So. 3d 919, 926 (La.
2009), r'hg denied, 2009 La. LEXIS 3425 (La. 2009).
75. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3458 (2007).
76. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3461 (2007).
77. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3449 cmt. c (2007).
78. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3462, 3464 (2007).
79. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 29, no. 539, at 268;
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 22, at 119.
80. PLANIOL, supra note 23, at 365.
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Like interruption, suspension also stops the running of the time
period, but instead of restarting the time period from zero,
suspension requires that the time period resume running from
where it stopped.8 ' For example, entering into a compromise
suspends prescription. 82 When a creditor and debtor enter into a
compromise, the time period during which the creditor must file
suit stops. If that compromise is rescinded, the creditor's time
period resumes running from the point at which it was stopped.
Whereas interruption is akin to hitting the restart button on a
stopwatch, suspension is like hitting the pause button.83 Since both
alter the running of the time period, neither may affect
peremption.
84
While they may not affect peremption, suspension
interruption, and renunciation can apply to prescriptive periods.85
This divergent consequence between peremption and prescription
81. 1 id. at 493. Under the Civil Code, suspension of prescription should
only occur when legislation provides for it. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3457
(2007). Examples of legislatively prescribed suspensions include between
spouses during marriage, parents and children during minority, tutors and
minors during tutorship, and curators and interdicts during interdiction. LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 3469 (2007). Though suspension should only be created by
legislation, there is a judicially created suspensive doctrine called contra non
valentem. Contra non valentem prevents prescription from running in four
situations: (1) where there was some legal cause that prevented the courts or
their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiff's action; (2)
where there was some condition coupled with the contract or connected with the
proceedings that prevented the creditor from suing or acting; (3) where the
debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor from
availing himself of his cause of action; and (4) where the cause of action is not
known or reasonably knowable by the creditor, even though his ignorance is not
induced by the debtor. Corsey v. State Dep't of Corr., 375 So. 2d 1319, 1321-22
(La. 1979). Because this doctrine alters how the passage of time affects an
individual's ability to file suit, it-like the legislatively created suspensive
periods-should not apply to peremption. Naquin v. Lafayette Parish-Consol.
Gov't, 950 So. 2d 657, 668 (La. 2007); Davis v. Coregis Ins. Co., 789 So. 2d 7,
17 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2000), writ denied, 788 So. 2d 1192 (La. 2001). Courts,
however, occasionally apply the contra non valentem doctrine to peremptive
periods without referring to the doctrine by name. See Part II.B.
82. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3083 (Supp. 2008).
83. 1 PLANIOL, supra note 23, pt. 2, at 593 (La. State Law Inst. trans., I th
ed. 1959) (1939).
84. That interruption does not apply to peremption must be understood to
mean that interruption does not apply to non-filed peremptive claims. If an
action subject to peremption is filed within the peremptive period and the time
period lapses while the claim is amid litigation, the claim will not be dismissed
due to peremption. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 3461 cmt. c (2007). "[S]o long as
the action is pending the lapse of the period of peremption does not extinguish
the right." Id.
85. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3449, 3462-3472 (2007).
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has tangible effects. For instance, the right to claim spousal support
after a divorce is subject to a peremptive period of three years.8 6
The peremptive period may commence on the date that the last
payment of spousal support is voluntarily made.8 7 Therefore, if the
former husband voluntarily pays spousal support to his ex-wife on
January 1, 2005, and fails to provide spousal support thereafter, the
ex-wife must file a cause of action for spousal support prior to
January 1, 2008; thereafter her action is perempted.
Suppose, however, the ex-husband voluntarily makes his last
payment on January 1, 2005, and then becomes financially unable to
make subsequent payments. Instead of going to court, the ex-
husband calls his ex-wife on June 1, 2005, and acknowledges that he
owes her spousal support. If the time period for an action for spousal
support were prescriptive instead of peremptive, the ex-husband's
acknowledgment on June 1, 2005, would serve as an interruption. 
8
On that date, the prescriptive clock would be reset to zero, meaning
that the ex-wife would have a new three-year period in which to
bring an action for spousal support (i.e., until June 1, 2008). An
action for spousal support, though, is not prescriptive-it is
peremptive.89" Since peremption cannot be interrupted, the
acknowledgment made by the ex-husband has no effect on the
running of the peremptive period. Thus, despite the
acknowledgment by her ex-husband, in order to not lose her right to
spousal support, the ex-wife must file an action by January 1, 2008.
Another difference between peremption and prescription is that
a perempted claim cannot serve as the object of a natural
obligation, 90 whereas a prescribed claim may.9 ' "A natural
obligation arises from circumstances in which the law implies a
particular moral duty to render a performance." 92 Though natural
86. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 117 (1999).
87. Id. The word "may" is used because Civil Code article 117 provides
three different commencement dates for the peremptive period for the right to
claim spousal support after a divorce. See id.
88. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3464 (2007).
89. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 117 (1999).
90. State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso, 842 So. 2d 346, 349 (La. 2003) (citing
Reeder v. North, 701 So. 2d 1291, 1298 (La. 1997)); State v. Mclnnis Bros.
Constr., 701 So. 2d 937, 939 (La. 1997); Hebert v. Doctors Mem'l Hosp., 486
So. 2d 717, 723 (La. 1986); Davis v. Coregis Ins. Co., 789 So. 2d 7, 17 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 2000) (citing Hebert, 486 So. 2d at 723), writ denied, 788 So. 2d
1192 (La. 2001).
91. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1762 (2008).
92. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1760 (2008). For a full discussion of how a
moral duty turns into a natural obligation, see SAUL LrrvINoFF, OBLIGATIONS §
2.4, in 5 LOUIsIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 28-29 (2d ed. 2001).
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obligations are alone not enforceable by law,93 a promise to fulfill
a natural obligation may serve as the object and cause for a civil
obligation.94 This civil obligation operates as an onerous contract
because each party gains an advantage: the creditor receives the
performance of the contract while the debtor is freed from his
moral duty.95 Because a perempted claim may not serve as the
object of a natural obligation, the promise to fulfill a perempted
claim cannot serve as the object and cause of a civil obligation.
The classic example of such a situation is the promise to pay a
prescribed claim. 96 In the previous example, assume that instead of
calling his ex-wife on June 1, 2005, the ex-husband sends her a
letter on June 1, 2008, six months after the ex-wife's right to
spousal support is extinguished by peremption. In this letter, the
ex-husband promises to pay all of the payments of spousal support
that he missed. If the right were prescriptive, the ex-wife's right to
claim spousal support, though prescribed, would serve as the
object of the ex-husband's natural obligation. This natural
obligation would be the object of an onerous contract that the ex-
husband made in writing with his ex-wife, and that onerous
contract would be enforceable by law.
The right to claim spousal support, however, is subject to
peremption,9 7 not prescription. Because the ex-wife's underlying
right is destroyed on January 1, 2008, due to her inaction, the ex-
husband owes no moral duty to the ex-wife on June 1, 2008 (at
least no moral duty as implied by the Civil Code). Therefore, there
is no natural obligation. With no natural obligation, there is no
object of an onerous contract, so nothing is enforceable at law.98
The ex-husband's written promise to pay spousal support is not
legally binding because the ex-wife's right to spousal support is
subject to peremption.
In addition to the aforementioned substantive distinctions
between peremption and prescription, there are procedural
93. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1761 (2008).
94. For a full discussion of how a natural obligation gives rise to a civil
obligation, see L1TVINOFF, supra note 92, § 2.7, at 32-33.
95. Id. § 2.23, at 38; see LA. CWV. CODE ANN. art. 1909 (2008).
96. The Civil Code lists the duty to fulfill a prescribed claim as an example
of a circumstance in which the law implies a moral duty. LA. Crv. CODE ANN.
art. 1762(1) (2008).
97. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 117(1999).
98. Though the promise the ex-husband made on June 1, 2008, could be
classified as a gratuitous donation (see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1523 (2000)),
gratuitous donations, unlike onerous contracts, require an authentic act to be
valid. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1541 (Supp. 2009). As there was no authentic act




differences between the two doctrines. These distinctions are also a
function of the institutions' fundamental differences. Peremption
may be supplied by the court (or it may be pleaded),99 whereas
prescription must be specially pleaded by the defendant.'0 0 Since
peremption destroys the underlying right, a claimant filing suit
after the peremptive period has no cause of action because the
claimant has no right."" As such, it makes sense that the court may
provide the exception of peremption; if there is no underlying
right, there is no claim on which to litigate, regardless of whether
the defendant raised the appropriate exception. With prescription,
however, the right still remains even after the prescriptive period
has run. Consequently, the defendant may graciously waive (or
negligently allow) the defense of prescription and permit the
claimant to continue his prescribed claim.
By way of example, an action for legal malpractice is subject to
two periods of peremption. °2 If these periods were prescriptive
instead of peremptive, then an attorney who is sued for malpractice
and negligently fails to plead the exception of prescription in his
answer could not be saved from litigation by the court supplying
the defense of prescription. Because the time periods for legal
malpractice are peremptive, though, an attorney facing a legal
malpractice claim need not plead peremption-the trial court or the
appellate court can supply on its own the exception.
10 3
99. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3460 (2007).
100. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3452 (2007); 2008 La. Acts No. 824.
101. Prior to the 2008 revision of article 927 in the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure, the appropriate peremptory exception to bring in order to claim that
the claimant was perempted from pursuing his claim was an exception of no
cause of action. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 927 (2005); Russland
Enters. v. City of Gretna, 727 So. 2d 1223, 1226 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1999), writ
denied, 743 So. 2d 669 (La. 1999); Poree v. Elite Elevator Servs., Inc., 665 So.
2d 133, 136 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995) (Barry, J. dissenting), writ denied, 667 So.
2d 1053 (La. 1996); Davis v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 469 So. 2d 1144, 1147
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1985). Routinely, however, claimants filed exceptions of
prescription. See, e.g., Saia v. Asher, 825 So. 2d 1257, 1259 n.5 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2002); Poree, 665 So. 2d at 134. On occasion, claimants filed an "Exception
of Prescription and Peremption." See, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. Hilton, 966 So. 2d
545, 549 (La. 2007); Turner v. Consol. Underwriters, 176 So. 2d 420, 421 (La.
1965). In 2008, the legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure article 927 to
include a peremptory exception for peremption. 2008 La. Acts No. 824. Though
countless defendants erred when raising their defense of peremption, the
inclusion of a peremptory exception for peremption is unnecessary. If a claim is
perempted, the claimant has no right and therefore has no cause of action.
102. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5605 (2007).
103. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3460 (2007); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art.
2163 (2002).
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Although the procedural and substantive differences in
peremption and prescription are vast, the fact remains that on a
superficial level, both institutions have the same effect: they
prevent the claimant from filing suit. The problems of peremption
occur because peremption and prescription have such shallow
similarities while maintaining deep, doctrinal distinctions.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH PEREMPTION
The problems with peremption originate in the doctrine's
bedrock principle that rights may only exist for a finite period of
time. Because the institution is built on this foundation, it naturally
produces inequitable results. Legislative and judicial attempts to
rectify these injustices cause the misapplication of the doctrine.
Misapplications increase the confusion in determining whether a
time period is peremptive. The only way to end such confusion is
to legislatively or judicially clarify the classification of each right,
but once a right is firmly characterized as peremptive, the original
problem of inequity returns.
A. Inequity
For debtors, peremption serves as an extraordinary protective
measure because it destroys the creditor's right upon nonuse. This
extinction, however, has inequitable effects. Because a right
subject to peremption has a temporally limited existence that
cannot be altered, the creditor's right may be terminated before he
is aware that the right ever existed. Similarly, a creditor may know
of his right but still lose that right through peremption because he
is unable to exercise the right through no fault of his own during
the peremptive period. In either case, the creditor is never afforded
a meaningful opportunity to bring his claim. Because of
peremption, inequity inherently occurs.
Courts readily acknowledge in such situations that the laws of
peremption are unjust. 1°4 Such unjust situations arise with some
degree of frequency in the realm of legal malpractice. Legal
malpractice is subject to two peremptive periods: "one year from
the date that the alleged act.., is discovered or should have been
discovered" and in no event later than "three years from the date of
104. Reeder v. North, 701 So. 2d 1291, 1296 (La. 1997); Biggers v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 1179, 1183 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2004); Raby-Magee v.
Matzen, 764 So. 2d 978, 979 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000); Drennan v. Killian, 712
So. 2d 978, 980 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1998).
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the alleged act. . ,"105 This means that if a lawyer performs an
action that gives rise to a claim of legal malpractice, the client has
one year from the date that the client discovered or should have
discovered the lawyer's negligent act, but, regardless of when the
client discovers the negligence, the client must bring his claim
within three years of the negligent act.
The effect of this peremptive time period is that "a person's
claim may be extinguished before he realizes the full extent of his
damages" 10 6 or before he realizes he has damages at all. This was
allegedly the situation in Brumfield v. McElwee."°7 In Brumfield,
the claimant originally filed a personal injury suit for in juries
sustained while playing in a high school basketball game. 1° The
attorney for the claimant's personal injury case abandoned the case
without telling the claimant, which led to the dismissal of the case
with prejudice. 10 9 The claimant, unaware of the status of his case
and unhappy with this attorney's unresponsiveness, retained new
counsel who discovered that the original personal injury case had
been dismissed with prejudice. 110 The claimant then filed a legal
malpractice action against his former attorney,"' but the filing of
the malpractice suit took place more than three years after the
former attorney had abandoned the personal injury suit. 112 In a
correct application of the doctrine of peremption, the Brumfield
court held that the client's claim was perempted, and thus the client
could not file suit despite the fact that, during the peremptive
period, the claimant was unaware that he had potentially been a
victim of legal malpractice. 113
105. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5605 (2007).
106. Reeder, 701 So. 2d at 1296; see Delahaye v. Plaisance, No. 2007 CA
1697, 2008 WL 2065927, at *3 (La. App. 1st Cir. May 2, 2008) (holding that the
peremptive period for legal malpractice may extinguish the plaintiff's claim
prior to his knowledge of the exact amount of tax liability he was exposed to as
a result of a settlement agreement), writ denied, 992 So. 2d 945 (La. 2008).
107. 976 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2008).
108. Id. at 236-37.
109. Id. at 237-38.
110. Id. at 242.
111. Id. at237.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 243. The possibility that a client's legal malpractice claim will
become extinguished before the client is cognizant of the claim becomes even
greater given that "Louisiana courts have consistently held that 'the knowledge
of an attorney, actual or otherwise, is imputed to his or her client."' Davis v.
Conroy, No. 09-142, 2009 La. App. LEXIS 1752, at *8 (La. App. 5th Cir. Oct.
13, 2009). Thus, if all that Louisiana Revised Statute § 9:5605 requires for the
peremptive period to commence is that the client "should have known that a
lawyer's actions or inaction may cause the client to incur damages," and the
client is imputed with all knowledge-actual or otherwise-of the lawyer, then
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In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the legal
malpractice statute contains "perceived inequities.""14 These
inequities are the natural outcome of peremption. If a right exists
for an absolute, limited period of time, there is always the
possibility that a potential claimant will be unaware of his right
until after it is extinguished.
This situation becomes more prevalent-and arguably more
unfair-the shorter the time period. Courts, in determining if a
limitation is peremptive, use the length of the time period as an
indicator of the legislature's intent to characterize a period as
peremptive. 115 The rationale is that short time periods indicate a
desire by the legislature to protect debtors; the shorter the time
period, the more likely the time period was intended to be
peremptive. 116 From a creditor's perspective, however, the shorter
the time period, the more likely it is that the creditor may be
unaware of his legal rights prior to their termination. As such, one
indicator courts use to determine if a right is subject to peremption
increases the inherent inequities that exist within the doctrine.
Some courts defend the termination of creditors' rights through
peremption because peremption serves a greater purpose by
protecting "public policy. ' ' 7 In examining many of the rights
subject to peremption, this argument has some merit. Filiation it is
a prime example of an area of law with numerous peremptive
periods that strive to promote family stability and protect children
from an "upheaval of [filiation] litigation."] 19"
the client's claim could be extinguished merely because the attorney was aware
of his own malpractice, even though the client was never actually aware of the
malpractice. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5605 (2007); see Davis, 2009 La. App.
LEXIS 1752, at *7-8.
114. Brumfeld, 976 So. 2d at 242 (quoting Reeder v. North, 701 So. 2d 1291,
1297 (La. 1997)).
115. See infra Part II.C.
116. See Metro. Erection Co. v. Landis Constr., 627 So. 2d 144, 148 (La.
1993).
117. See, e.g., Broadscape.com v. Matthews, 980 So. 2d 140, 145 (La. App.
4th Cir. 2008); Brumfield, 976 So. 2d at 241. A similar argument was raised by
French courts in the mid-1800s. AUBRY & RAu, supra note 32, § 771, at 423.
For example, the right to establish paternity was subject to forfeiture because it
was "of a higher order of interest [that] prevent[ed] troubles in families." Cour
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Rouen, le ch., Aug. 5, 1863, S. Jur. II
1863,229 (Fr.).
118. Filiation is a juridical relation that unites a child to his father or mother.
J.-R. Trahan, Glossae on the New Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 387, 388 n.1
(2007) (citations omitted).
119. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Who's Your Momma, Who Are Your Daddies?
Louisiana's New Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 307, 324 (2007).
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Even within filiation, however, the inequities of peremption
cannot go unrecognized. For example, under Louisiana's rules of
filiation, an alleged biological father has a one-year peremptive
period to establish paternity as to a child who is presumed to be the
child of another man.120 This time period commences on the date
the child is born. 121 Assume that a husband and wife marry on
January 1, 2007. The wife has an affair on March 1, 2007, and
gives birth to a child on January 1, 2008. Though the law presumes
that the husband is the father of the child, 122 as the child's features
develop, the mother questions this presumption. On January 1,
2009, unhappy in her marriage and convinced that the child is not
biologically related to her husband, the mother files to divorce the
husband. She tells the alleged biological father that she thinks he is
the true father of the child. He submits to a blood test the following
day, confirms the mother's suspicions, and reignites his
relationship with her. Despite his attempts to create a family, at
this point the biological father has lost his right to establish
paternity because his right is subject to -a one-year peremptive
period commencing at the child's birth. 23 His right to establish
paternity has been destroyed forever. 124
120. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2007).
121. Id.
122. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 185 (2007).
123. Had the mother in bad faith deceived the biological father of his
paternity, the biological father's time period to institute an action would be a
one-year peremptive period "from the day [he] knew or should have known of
his paternity, or within ten years from the day of the birth of the child,
whichever first occurs." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2007). Because the
mother in this scenario was unsure of the biological father's paternity until
January 2009, it is unlikely that she would be found to be in bad faith. See LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1997 cmt. b (2008) (defining bad faith as the intentional
and malicious failure to perform an obligation).
124. Though the biological father's right to establish paternity no longer
exists, he could be able to filiate to the child based on actions taken by the
mother. The mother has the right to contest paternity of her husband and assert
that the biological father is the true father. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 192 (2007).
However, the mother cannot contest paternity until she is remarried, and
remarriage cannot occur until the mother is divorced. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art.
88 (1999); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 192 (2007). If the mother files for a no-fault
divorce under Civil Code article 103(1), as is likely to occur, the divorce will
take a minimum of 365 days because there is a minor child involved. LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. arts. 103(1), 103.1(2) (2007). The mother's right to contest paternity
is subject to two peremptive periods, one of those periods requiring the mother
to file suit within two years of the child's birth. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 193
(2007) (providing that a contestation action must be filed within two years of the
child's birth and 180 days of remarriage). By the time the mother is divorced
from her husband, her right to contest the husband's paternity and establish the
paternity of the biological father will also be perempted, thus denying the
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Undoubtedly, protecting children and preserving families are
important public policies that society should defend. In the above
situation, though, it is not clear that peremption is the best
mechanism for protecting these public policies. The original family
of husband, mother, and child is no longer an actual unit, and the
theoretical subsequent family of biological father, mother, and
child is prevented from becoming a legally bound unit.125 Allowing
the biological father to filiate to the child in this scenario would
arguably be in the best interest of the child because then the
biological father, mother, and child can become a legally bound
family with reciprocal duties of support.12 6 Be that as it may,
because of the current peremptive periods that govern filiation, this
desirable result will not occur.
Regardless of the importance of the public policies that
peremption purports to protect, the fact remains that the doctrine
can lead to inequitable results. However, courts-and occasionally
legislators-are not always willing to ignore these perceived
inequities. In their attempts to remedy the inequities caused by
peremption, courts and the legislature create a further problem: the
misapplication of peremption.
B. Misapplication
In order to prevent unjust applications of peremption, courts
and the legislature make piecemeal revisions to specific
applications of the doctrine. These well-intentioned efforts
constitute misapplications of peremption because the changes
made are frequently inapposite to the foundational principles of the
institution. For example, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1067 provides that incidental demands are not "barred" by
biological father a remedy via the mother. Paternity may still be established by
the child filing an action to establish paternity. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 197
(2007). No peremptive or prescriptive period, in this situation, is attached to the
child's right. Id. However, it hardly seems that the public policy is to place the
onus of filiation on the child.
125. Unless the child establishes paternity, the biological father will never
have a legal duty to support the child. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 227 (2007)
(providing that parents owe their children support, maintenance, and education).
Moreover, the biologically unrelated husband, who is now removed from the
child's life, will have a continuing duty to support the child because the time
period in which he could have disavowed paternity has passed. See LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 189 (2007) (providing that the husband has a one-year
prescriptive period from the date he learned or should have learned of the birth
of the child).
126. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 227, 229 (2007).
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peremption provided they are filed within ninety days of service of
the main demand and were "not barred at the time the main
demand was filed .... , In effect, this rule extends peremption
for certain incidental demands for ninety days following service of
the main demand. Because peremption, by definition, creates a
fixed period of time for the existence of a right, 28 any extension of
that time period constitutes a misapplication.
By way of example of the misapplication of peremption in
Code of Civil Procedure article 1067, suppose an attorney
performs legal services for a client on January 1, 2007. The client
never pays the attorney because the client has believed since
January 1, 2007, that the attorney committed legal malpractice.
The attorney files an action against the client for payment of
services rendered. The client is served with notice of this suit on
December 31, 2007. In accordance with the general rules of
peremption, the client must file her claim for legal malpractice
"one year from the date that the alleged act ... is discovered," so,
in this case, before January 1, 2008.129 The Code of Civil
Procedure, however, allows the client to file her claim until March
31, 2008, because the client's action for legal malpractice is an
incidental demand to the lawyer's principal demand. The client's
claim for legal malpractice was not perempted on December 31,
2007, when the principal demand was served on the client, so the
client has an additional ninety days to bring her action. In this
instance, the extension of peremption for incidental demands
provides equity to the client; if the attorney sues the client for
payment, it seems only fair that the client be able to sue the
attorney for malpractice. 13 Be that as it may, allowing for such
127. LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 1067 (2005). The use of the word
"barred" is inappropriate in reference to peremption, as peremption is a mode of
extinguishing rights. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3458 (2007). "Barred," however,
is appropriate in reference to prescription.
Incidental demands include demands in reconvention, cross-claims,
intervention, and demands against third parties. LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art.
1031 (2005). In the case of third-party defendants, the ninety-day period
commences with the service of process on the third party. LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 1067 (2005). Filing an incidental demand, however, should not be
confused with filing an amended or supplemental petition that relates back to the
original filing under Code of Civil Procedure article 1153. LA. CODE CIv. PROC.
ANN. art. 1153 (2005). The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a party may
not file a supplemental petition that relates back to the original filing when the
filing of the supplemental petition occurs outside of the peremptive period.
Naghi v. Brener, 17 So. 3d 919 (La. 2009).
128. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3458 (2007).
129. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5605 (2007).
130. It has been stated that protection for the defendant-in this case the
client-was the purpose in enacting Code of Civil Procedure article 1067. See
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equities effectually extends the client's peremptive period. This
runs counter to the principal notion behind peremption, namely
that particular rights-such as an action for legal malpractice-are
destroyed when the peremptive period lapses.
The legislature regularly makes other exceptions to the rule
that peremption may not be interrupted or suspended. Actions
against officers of banks are subject to peremption but may be
interrupted by the filing of suit.1 3r This means that if suit is filed
against a bank officer on the last day of the peremptive period and
is dismissed without prejudice one month later (i.e., one month
after the peremptive period has lapsed), the claimant may re-file
his suit because the time period affecting his right was restarted by
his original filing. Under the general rules of peremption, such an
interruption should not take place.1
32
While the interruption regarding bank officers is limited in
scope in that it only applies to a particular category of persons, the
legislature has also provided very broad statutes that run afoul of
the doctrine of peremption. Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
legislation was passed that suspended all peremptive periods that
"would have otherwise lapsed during the time period of August 26,
2005, through January 3, 2006.'133 Though certainly well-
MAX TOBIAS JR., JOHN M. LANDIS & GERALD E. MEUNIER, LOUISIANA CIVIL
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE § 10:38, in LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES 541 (2008-2009
ed. 2008). Be that as it may, the client will only be able to sue the attorney if the
attorney files his action within the client's peremptive period. If the client's
claim for legal malpractice is perempted when the attorney brings his cause of
action, the client may not file his incidental demand. Had the attorney filed his
claim on January 2, 2008, the client would not receive the benefit of Code of
Civil Procedure article 1067. Therefore, any time when the time period affecting
the principal demand exceeds the time period affecting the incidental demand,
the principal demand may be filed so as to keep the incidental demand
perempted. Regardless of when the attorney files suit, the client would not be
required to pay the attorney if malpractice took place. The client would argue
that by committing malpractice, the attorney failed to perform his contractual
obligation, thus dissolving the contract. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2013,
2018 (2008).
131. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6:293, :787, :1191 (2005). The statutes require
that the filing of suit be done in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper
venue. Id. This is the same requirement attached to interruption by filing of suit
for prescription. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3462 (2007).
132. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3461 (2007).
133. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5822(A) (2007). Ultimately, no claims
regarding a right subject to a peremptive period were reported under the statute,
but had a perempted claim covered by the statute been brought, the peremptive
period would have been suspended.
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intentioned, the statute was inapposite to the general rule that
"[p]eremption may not be... suspended."'' 34
Like the legislature, courts also misapply the doctrine of
peremption. In Leger v. Weinstein, the Louisiana Third Circuit
Court of Appeal opted to disregard the peremptive periods that
apply to an action for legal malpractice.135 The claim of
malpractice in Leger arose when the clients realized their attorney
was negligently handling their case. 136 The clients fired the
attorney, retained new counsel, and filed a claim of legal
malpractice against the original attorney.' 37 After the original
attorney was made aware that his services were no longer desired,
he continued filing motions in the original case on behalf of the
clients without their knowledge.138 The court found that the clients'
original action for legal malpractice was premature and dismissed
their case under the theory that if any of the motions filed by the
original attorney were effective, the clients would have no grounds
for leal malpractice because the clients would not have suffered a
loss. Once the original attorney's motions were denied, the
clients re-filed their suit for legal malpractice. 40 By that point,
more than one year had passed since the clients had actual
knowledge of the original attorney's negligent act.' 4 1 Faced with
the possibility that a claim for legal malpractice could be
perempted before it ever ripened, the third circuit chose to
disregard the legislatively provided peremptive periods. 142 To do
otherwise, the court stated, would produce "serious injustice" and
"an absurd result."'143 Though the court's disregard for the
peremptive period may be an equitable resu!t, the facts of Leger
indicate that based on the clear text of the legal malpractice statute,
the claim was perempted. To find otherwise implies that the court
is not required to apply the doctrine of peremption, but instead has
134. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3461 (2007).
135. 885 So. 2d 701, 707 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004), writ denied, 893 So. 2d
873 (La. 2005).
136. Ironically, the case being handled by the attorney was one for legal
malpractice. Id. at 703.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. In order to bring a claim for legal malpractice, a client must show (1)
the existence of an attorney-client relationship, (2) negligence on part of the
attorney, and (3) that the attorney's negligence caused the client a loss. WILLIAM
E. CRAWFORD, TORT LAW § 15.21, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 267-
68 (2000).
140. Leger, 885 So. 2d at 703.
141. Id. at 705.
142. Id. at 706.
143. Id.
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the option to ignore the doctrine when the court deems such
actions are reasonable.
The Louisiana Supreme Court also misapplied peremption in
Teague v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. In Teague, an
attorney allegedly committed two acts of legal malpractice: first,
on August 1, 1999, the attorney failed to file the required jury
bond, thus resulting in the loss of the right to trial by jury; second,
on October 29, 1999, the attorney mediated the case to the
dissatisfaction of the client. 145 On October 29, 1999, the same date
as the second negligent act, the settlement was made known to the
client. 146 According to the legal malpractice statute, the client had
one year from the time the alleged act "is discovered or should
have been discovered" to file suit.147 The Teague court, however,
slightly shifted the commencement date by stating that it is not the
knowledge of the alleged act that commences the running of
peremption, but the "knowledge of the cause or reason for the
undesirable result that commences the running of peremption.'
' 48
This minor shift in language created a major change in the
outcome; the court found that though the client knew of the
negligent act on October 29, 1999 (more than one year before
filing suit), he did not realize the negligent act was the cause of the
undesirable result until "several weeks after October 29, 1999"
(less than one year before filing suit). 149 Therefore, his action filed
on November 3, 2000, was not perempted.
150
In addition to the suspect interpretation of the legal malpractice
statute, the Teague court also misapplied peremption in the
methodology it used to reach its decision. The court stated:
"Before we address the issue of peremption under legal
malpractice, we must first determine if defendants' conduct
constituted legal malpractice."' 51 By detailing the merits of the
case prior to determining whether the cause of action was
perempted, the court convincingly declared that "[s]ound policy
144. 974 So. 2d 1266 (La. 2008).
145. Id. at 1269.
146. Id.
147. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5605 (2007).
148. Teague, 974 So. 2d at 1277. To reach this result, the Teague court
compared the discovery rule in the legal malpractice statute to the discovery rule
in the doctrine of contra non valentem. Id. at 1274-75. As the court noted,
however, contra non valentem does not apply to peremption. Id. at 1275 n.4.
149. Id. at 1278.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1272. But see Stanley v. Trinchard, No. 02-1235, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51840, at *32-33 (E.D. La. July 27, 2008) ("In light of the fact that [the
client's] malpractice claims axe [sic] time-barred, the Court need not address the
remaining issues raised by [the client] in this motion.").
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reasons" supported its holding that the claim was not perempted.'52
This is a misapplication of peremption because it implies that
whether a claim is perempted depends on the merits of the
underlying claim. Such insinuations are simply untrue. If a claim is
perempted, the underlying right is non-existent, regardless of how
merit-worthy the cause of action was prior to its extinction. The
result-oriented methodology of Teague suggests that there is an
equitable underpinning to peremption, thereby reinforcing the
Leger court-type notions that peremption may be regarded or
disregarded as the court deems reasonable.
Such implications may appear to be harmless given the facts to
which they apply. However, these misapplications of peremption
have been followed by other state courts. Within months of the
Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Teague, the Louisiana
Second Circuit Court of Appeal-relying on the Teague court's
analysis-concluded that the legal malpractice statute includes "an
equitable suspension of the one-year peremption period.9
1 53
Unquestionably this statement is incorrect.
Misapplications of peremption frequently arise because of
courts' desires to prevent inequitable results. These errors usually
involve the application of prescriptive principles to peremptive
periods. For example, interruption by the filing of suit is a rule that
applies to prescription154 and is currently applied to the peremptive
periods affecting actions against bank officers.15 5 Suspension of
time limitations is also a characteristic of prescription. 156 The
legislature utilized this prescriptive device in the legislation
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.1 57 Even the actions by the
Leger court in disregarding peremption may be said to be an
application of the doctrine of contra non valentem agere non currit
praescriptio,158 a doctrine that applies only to prescription.'
59
Under contra non valentem, prescription is suspended if there is a
legal cause that "render[s] it impossible to institute a suit until after
the expiration of the [prescription period] .,,160 The clients in Leger
152. Teague, 974 So. 2d at 1277.
153. McGuire v. Mosley Rogers Title Co., No. 43,554-CA, 2008 WL
4226026, at *7 (La. App. 2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2008), writ denied, 999 So. 2d 757
(La. 2009).
154. See LA. CV. CODE ANN. art. 3462 (2007).
155. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6:293, :787, :1191 (2005).
156. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3467 (2007).
157. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:5822, :5824 (2007).
158. "Prescription does not run against one who is unable to act."
159. Davis v. Coregis Ins. Co., 789 So. 2d 7, 17 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2000), writ
denied, 788 So. 2d 1192 (La. 2001).
160. Smith v. Taylor, 10 Rob. 133, 135 (La. 1845). Legal obstacle was the
original reason that the doctrine of contra non valentem was developed.
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were prevented from filing suit any earlier than they did because
the court originally held that their claim was premature.' 61 Because
they were prevented by a legal cause from instituting their suit
until after the expiration of the peremptive period, the court
allowed the tardy filing. '
62
The problem with applying-or misapplying-prescriptive
rules to peremptive periods is that it muddies the distinction
between peremption and prescription, thus giving the illusion that
the two doctrines are more than just superficially similar. As such,
misapplying the doctrine of peremption makes distinguishing
between peremption and prescription all the more onerous.
C. Confusion
Distinguishing between peremption and prescription has been
problematic since the origins of the doctrines. Unfortunately, the
codification of peremption in Louisiana did little to reduce this
confusion. Courts in Louisiana continue to vacillate between
peremption and prescription when classifying particular rights. To
combat the confusion, courts have developed an analytical
framework within which to consider what time period affects the
right. However, the factors utilized by courts when characterizing
rights do not always lead to the conclusive results desired.
Since the inception of peremption, French commentators such
as Aubry and Rau, Merlin, and Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier
had great difficulty in articulating a test to determine whether a
time period is peremptive or prescriptive; those that attempted to
delineate the doctrines did so with little success. Aubry and Rau
proposed that "prescriptions [apply] whenever a time limitation for
the exercise of an action in court is involved; and . . . forfeiture
when the time limit is afforded to declare an intent for a different
purpose."'163 Merlin believed that jurists "must consider it as
established that forfeiture is subject to all the rules governing
liberative prescription, unless the statutes provide differently in a
particular case, whether the rule is explicit or implicit."'
164
Bartolous first inserted the maxim in his glosses on Justinian's Digest to provide
that "prescription did not run against a son with regard to property outside the
paternal estate . . . until he was free from paternal power." BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE & TIssiER, supra note 29, no. 367, at 192.
161. Leger v. Weinstein, 885 So. 2d 701, 703 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004), writ
denied, 893 So. 2d 873 (La. 2005).
162. Id. at 707.
163. AUBRY & RAu, supra note 32, § 771, at 421.
164. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 29, no. 36, at 23.
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Unsatisfied by the explanations of other jurists, Baudry-
Lacantinerie and Tissier concluded that "[no] one can define a
priori any differences between what are called forfeitures and what
is [sic] called prescriptions.' ' 65
Louisiana scholars and courts have had no more success than
their French counterparts. In an essay attempting to differentiate
the two doctrines, Professor Joseph Dainow concluded that
"[t]here are important implications in each classification, and a
clearer delineation [in the Civil Code] of all of them would be a
contribution."' 66 Ideally, the clarity that Dainow desired should
have occurred in 1982 when the articles on prescription were
revised and peremption gained legislative footing.' 67 Instead, the
articles themselves contained no specific, meaningful guidance,
and the comments simply stated that the determination should be
made based on the purpose of the rule.' 68 Foreshadowing years of
confusion on this subject, the comments to the peremption articles
also noted that "[i]t is not always easy to determine whether a
period of time fixed by law is peremptive or prescriptive.'
169
Louisiana courts have proved the accuracy of such comments
by their frequent vacillation between the two doctrines. For
example, an action to annul a judgment for fraud or ill practices-
which is entitled "[a]nnulment for vices of substance; peremption
of action°170 -has been held to be both peremptive171 and
prescriptive. 172 The Louisiana Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement on the matter is that the right is subject to
peremption. 173 Differing authority similarly exists regarding claims
165. Id. no. 40, at 28.
166. Dainow, supra note 62, at 132; see also Shuey, supra note 55, at 252.
167. 1982 La. Acts No. 187; see notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
168. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3458 cmt. c (2007).
169. Id.
170. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2004 (2003) (emphasis added).
171. Williams v. Williams, 22 So. 3d 1165, 1169-70 (La. App. 3d Cir.
2009); Lowe's Cos. v. Leblanc, 839 So. 2d 434, 437 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2003);
Russland Enters., Inc. v. City of Gretna, 727 So. 2d 1223, 1226 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1999), writ denied, 743 So. 2d 669 (La. 1999); A.S. v. M.C., 685 So. 2d
644, 648 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996), writ denied, 690 So. 2d 38 (La. 1997);
Burkett v. Prop. of Douglas, 575 So. 2d 888, 892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); In re
S.R., 582 So. 2d 956, 958 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991), writ denied, 585 So. 2d 574
(La. 1991); Davis v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 469 So. 2d 1144,
1146 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
172. Stewart v. Goeb, 432 So. 2d 246, 248 (La. 1983); State v. Turner, 705
So. 2d 293, 296 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997); Succession of Albritton, 497 So. 2d
10, 12 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986), writ denied, 498 So. 2d 742 (La. 1986).
173. Turner v. Busby, 883 So. 2d 412,416 (La. 2004).
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for workers' compensation.174 For many 7y'ears, there was great
confusion as to whether a survival action' and a wrongful death
action176 were subject to peremption or prescription. The majority
of recent cases hold that both actions are subject to prescription,'
though at least one court within the past decade declared the
actions to be peremptive.1
78
While clearly not always successful, courts have attempted to
develop an analysis for determining whether a time limitation is
peremptive. Originally, courts followed the test provided in
Guillory 179: if the statute created a right of action and stipulated the
time period to exercise that right, then the right was subject to a
peremptive period.180 This test evolved through the years to focus
174. Winford v. Conerly Corp., 897 So. 2d 560, 565 (La. 2005) (finding
workers' compensation claims to be prescriptive); Brister v. Wray Dickinson
Co., 164 So. 415, 416 (La. 1935) (finding workers' compensation claims to be
peremptive); Norwood v. Lake Bisteneau Oil Co., 83 So. 25, 27 (La. 1918)
(finding the limitations in the Employers' Liability Act to be prescriptive);
Schulin v. Serv. Painting Co., 479 So. 2d 939, 944 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985)
(finding workers' compensation claims to be peremptive). See generally H.
ALSTON JOHNSON III, WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 384, in 14 LouISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE 307-29 (2002).
175. CRAWFORD, supra note 139, § 5.9, at 99-100. E.g., Guidry v. Theriot,
377 So. 2d 319, 328 (La. 1979) (holding that a survival action is subject to
prescription); Woods v. Monroe Manor Nursing Homes, Inc., 530 So. 2d 1221,
1223 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a survival action is subject to
peremption), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 765 (La. 1988); Kennedy v. Powell, 401
So. 2d 453, 457 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981) (same), writ denied, 406 So. 2d 607
(La. 1981).
176. Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975) (holding that
the wrongful death action is subject to prescription); Stephenson v. New Orleans
Ry. & Light Co., 115 So. 412 (La. 1927) (holding that the wrongful death action
is subject to peremption); Goodwin v. Bodcaw Lumber Co., 34 So. 74 (La.
1902) (same); Sansone v. La. Power & Light Co., 164 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1964) (same), writ refused, 165 So. 2d 486 (La. 1964); Smith v. Monroe
Grocery Co., 171 So. 167 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936) (holding that the wrongful
death action is subject to peremption but may be interrupted); Matthews v.
Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 120 So. 907 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929) (holding that the
wrongful death action is subject to peremption). See generally Gerald J. Talbot,
Comment, Wrongful Death: Prescription? Peremption? Confusion!, 39 LA. LAW
REv. 1239 (1979).
177. Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186, 193-94 (La. 2008);
Tureaud v. Acadiana Nursing Home, 696 So. 2d 15, 17 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
See generally FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOuISIANA
TORT LAW § 18.08 (2d ed. 2004).
178. Courtland v. Century Indem. Co., 772 So. 2d 797, 801 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 2000), writ denied, 785 So. 2d 822 (La. 2001).
179. For a complete discussion of Guillory, see supra Part I.A.
180. Hebert v. Doctors Mem'l Hosp., 486 So. 2d 717, 724 (La. 1986);
Hollingsworth v. Schanland, 99 So. 613, 616 (La. 1924); Guillory v. Avoyelles
R.R. Co., 28 So. 899, 901 (La. 1900).
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on the text and purpose of the statute.' The Louisiana Supreme
Court described its process for determining if a limitation is
peremptive by stating:
When the statute does not indicate in plain words that the
period is one of peremption, the court must analyze the
statute in its entirety and construe the statute with particular
focus on whether the purpose sought to be achieved
involves matters of public policy or other compelling
reasons for absolutely extinguishing a right which is not
promptly exercised. 182
This analysis has been well-utilized by Louisiana courts. In
examining the legal malpractice statute, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has stated that "[t]he Legislature was particularly clear in
wording [the statute] so as to leave no doubt as to its intent."'
' 83
Therefore, no further interpretation of the legal malpractice statute
is necessary; the statute is peremptive. When further interpretation
is necessary, courts turn to the purpose of the statute. For example,
by examining the specific purpose of the filiation provisions, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that, prior to the revision of the
filiation articles, the right to disavow paternity was subject to a
peremptive period. 184 The Court reached this conclusion by
determining that the purpose of the six-month disavowal time
limitation was intended to "zealously guard[] and enforce[] the
presumption 8[of paternity]," thus protecting and preserving the
family unit.' 8 Similarly, the Private Works' Act is characterized as
peremptive because having short, extinctive rights helps fulfill the
purpose of the Act, that purpose being to facilitate the construction
of building improvements. 16 If general contractors were subject to
lengthy, non-extinctive liability, construction projects would be
hindered. 18
7
In an effort to establish firm guidelines for determining
peremptive periods, courts and scholars have tried to make broad
181. See State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso, 842 So. 2d 346, 349 (La. 2003); State
v. Mclnnis Bros. Constr., 701 So. 2d 937, 940 (La. 1997); Metro. Erection Co.
v. Landis Constr., 627 So. 2d 144, 147 (La. 1993); Pounds v. Schori, 377 So. 2d
1195, 1199-1200 (La. 1979); Conerly v. State ex rel. La. State Penitentiary, 858
So. 2d 636, 642-43 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2003), writ denied, 858 So. 2d 423 (La.
2003).
182. Metro. Erection Co., 627 So. 2d at 147.
183. Reeder v. North, 701 So. 2d 1291, 1295 (La. 1997).
184. Pounds, 377 So. 2d at 1200.
185. Id.
186. Metro. Erection Co., 627 So. 2d at 148.
187. Id.
2010] 1207
8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
statements regarding the classification of rights based on particular
characteristics that indicate the purpose of the time period. The
brevity of the existence of a right indicates the legislature's desire
to protect the defendant; the shorter the right, the more likely the
time period is to be peremptive.18 8 Some courts have even stated in
dicta that one factor in determining if a period is peremptive is
whether it is less than one year.' 8 9 Similarly, claims of a public law
nature are likely to be deemed peremptive because "there is ... a
strong interest in regulating the litigation" of such claims. 19° In
these situations, public policy "favor[s] a strict interpretation of the
requirements for interrupting the term," thus lending the time
period to be characterized as one of peremption.
19
Though these interpretive techniques have been enhanced
throughout the years, they do not always lead to clear results. The
shortcomings of the aforementioned factors are best demonstrated
in the Louisiana Supreme Court case Borel v. Young. 192 Borel
involved the question of whether an action for medical malpractice
was subject to peremption or prescription. 193 On original hearing,
the court held that the action was subject to peremption. 194 The
court reached this conclusion largely based on the text of the
statute,'95 which states that "[n]o action ... shall be brought unless
filed within one year" and "in all events such claims shall be filed
at the latest within ... three years."' 196 The use of the word "shall"
originally prompted the court to hold that an action for medical
malpractice is subject to peremption.197
When Borel came before the court on rehearing, the court
reversed itself and held that an action for medical malpractice is
subject to prescription. 19 On rehearing, the court found that there
188. AUBRY & RAU, supra note 32, § 771, at 422; Shuey, supra note 55, at
252.
189. See Hebert v. Doctors Mem'l Hosp., 486 So. 2d 717, 723 (La. 1986);
Conerly v. State ex rel. La. State Penitentiary, 858 So. 2d 636, 644 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 2003), writ denied, 858 So. 2d 432 (La. 2003).
190. Shuey, supra note 55, at 252; see Crier v. Whitecloud, 486 So. 2d 713,
714 (La. 1986); Conerly, 858 So. 2d at 644; Green v. La. Dep't of Safety &
Corr., 603 So. 2d 800, 802 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992); Weems v. Dep't of Pub.
Safety & Corr., 571 So. 2d 733, 735 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
191. Shuey, supra note 55, at 251.
192. Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42 (La. 2008) (Borel 1).
193. Id. at 53.
194. Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 51 (La. 2007) (Borell ).
195. Id. at 50.
196. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 (2007).
197. Borel 1, 989 So. 2d at 51. The Revised Statutes provide that "shall" is to
be interpreted as a mandatory provision. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:3 (2003).
198. BorelII, 989 So. 2d at 65.
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is no language in the statute that indicates a legislative intent for
the three-year time limit to be one of peremption. 199 That being the
case, the court examined the purpose of the statute.20 0 One of the
purposes of the Medical Malpractice Act is to control health
insurance costs. 2° 1 To achieve this goal, claimants are required to
file their complaints before a medical review panel prior to filing
suit in court.20 2 The Borel court found that the legislature
recognized that by requiring the filing with the medical review
panel first, claimants need the safeguard of the equitable
protections of prescription to ensure that claimants can bring their
claim in court. According to the court, the purpose of the statute
dictates that the time limitation is prescriptive.
Borel highlights the flaws in the jurisprudentially provided
factors for determining whether a limitation is peremptive: the text
and purpose do not always lead to the same result. In these
instances, courts are offered little guidance on how to determine
whether a statute creates a peremptive or prescriptive period.
Echoing the comments to the Civil Code, numerous courts have
stated that "it is not always easy to determine whether a particular
time limitation is prescriptive or peremptive. ' 2 °5 The difficulties
that courts face in characterizing rights leave courts, counselors,
and claimants wading in a pond of confusion. Given the confusion
that surrounds peremption, as well as the problems of inequity and
misapplication, it is past time that peremption underwent a vast
legislative overhaul.
III. SOLVING THE PROBLEMS: FouR LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
The three aforementioned problems with peremption are
cyclical in nature. Peremptive periods inherently lead to
inequitable results. Attempts at remedying these results cause
misapplications of the doctrine. Misapplications of the doctrine
199. Id. at 60-63.
200. Id. at 63-64.
201. Id. at 63.
202. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (2008).
203. Borel II, 989 So. 2d at 63.
204. Id. at 63--64. Despite the court's pronouncement in Borel that the
Medical Malpractice Act contains prescriptive periods, at least one Louisiana
Supreme Court Justice continues to assert that the time periods are peremptive.
See Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 La. LEXIS 2224, at *19-45 (Knoll,
J., concurring).
205. Borel II, 989 So. 2d at 59; see State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso, 842 So. 2d
346, 349 (La. 2003); State v. Mclnnis Bros. Constr., 701 So. 2d 937, 940 (La.
1997); Dendy v. City Nat'l Bank, 977 So. 2d 8, 14 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007);
Matheme v. Broussard, 959 So. 2d 975, 979 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007).
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increase confusion in determining whether a time period is
peremptive. When legislators or courts do succeed in clarifying
that a time period is subject to peremption, the original problem of
inequity returns. In other words, the solution to one problem of
peremption gives rise to a new problem, thus creating a perpetual
cycle of the problems with peremption.
There are, however, legislative actions that could quell these
concerns. Four mutually exclusive remedies include: (1) requiring
explicit legislative intent to create a peremptive period; (2) giving
guidance in the Civil Code for distinguishing between peremption
and prescription; (3) creating equitable exceptions to the
consequences of peremption; and (4) extinguishing peremption.
A. Require Explicit Legislative Intent
On rehearing, the Borel court succinctly stated that "[t]he
legislature would not 'hint' about ,eremption when it clearly
knows how to specify its intention." The court is correct; the
legislature is aware of how to ensure that a statute will be
considered peremptive. For example, the rules regarding filiation
demonstrate how clear the legislature can be.20 7 In providing when
a father can establish paternity if the child is presumed to be the
child of another man the Civil Code states that "[t]he time periods
.. are peremptve." 208 Such statements leave little room for doubt
in how the legislature intended the time period to be classified.
If the legislature wants to end confusion between peremption
and prescription, it can do so by creating a rule stating that unless
otherwise stated, prescription is the default time period.i09 This
would mean that when the legislature fails to make an explicit
statement that a time period is peremptive, the period would be
considered prescriptive. Enacting such a rule would end all
206. Borel II, 989 So. 2d at 63. "Had the Legislature meant for the time
period to be peremptive, it could have expressed its intent in the.., text of the
act [enacting the statute] . . . ." Id.
207. The Civil Code articles on filiation specify how each time period is to
be classified. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 186, 189, 190, 193, 195, 197, 198
(2007).
208. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2007).
209. Conversely, a rule could be made that if the legislature fails to expressly
classify a time period, the period is automatically considered to be peremptive.
Having prescription serve as the default rule is superior, though, because
prescription does not create the same inequities as peremption because
prescription may be interrupted, suspended, and renounced. See supra Part I.B.
Also, because prescription has existed in Louisiana law for a longer period of
time, there is a greater understanding of the doctrine by Louisiana courts. Thus,
prescription is the better default rule.
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confusion for courts, lawyers, and claimants because the
classification of the time period would be clear from the text of the
statute. This solution also has the advantage of being easy to
implement, requiring only the inclusion of one additional article in
the Civil Code: "Time limitations provided by legislation are
prescriptive unless otherwise explicitly provided in the legislation
establishing the time limitation."
The proposed article mirrors the first step that courts claim to
take when analyzing whether a period is peremptive. 210 If a statute
indicates in plain words that it is peremptive-as in the case of
filiation-then the court discontinues its analysis and accepts the
legislatively provided classification.211 Under this solution, if the
statute indicates in plain words that it is peremptive, the court
should accept that characterization; if the statute is silent, the court
should consider the period to be prescriptive.
Aside from being easy to implement, this solution has the
added benefit of having already been proven effective. Prior to the
1986 revision of the Civil Code article regarding survival actions,
article 2315.1, there was great confusion as to whether the survival
action was subject to peremption or prescription. The article was
revised to provide expressly that the time period was
prescriptive.2  All confusion subsequently ceased.2 14 By requiring
that legislation expressly state whether the time period is
peremptive, all confusion surrounding the peremption doctrine
may cease.
There are, however, disadvantages to this remedy. It does
nothing to prevent the perceived inequities of peremption; a
claimant may still lose his right to sue before he knows that the
right existed. This solution also does not prevent the
misapplication of peremption; courts may continue to propose
incorrect notions, such as the notion that peremption is subject to
"equitable suspension[s]. ' 215  Perhaps the biggest drawback,
210. SeePartll.C.
211. Metro. Erection Co. v. Landis, 627 So. 2d 144, 147 (La. 1993); St.
Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. GAF Corp., 512 So. 2d 1165, 1169 (La. 1987).
212. CRAWFORD, supra note 139, § 5.9, at 99-100; see, e.g., Guidry v.
Theriot, 377 So. 2d 319, 328 (La. 1979); Jones v. Philco-Ford Corp., 452 So. 2d
370, 372 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), writ denied, 457 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1984);
Woods v. Monroe Manor Nursing Homes, Inc., 530 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1988), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 765 (La. 1988); Kennedy v. Powell,
401 So. 2d 453, 457 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981), writ denied, 406 So. 2d 697 (La.
1981).
213. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.1(C) (Supp. 2008).
214. See CRAWFORD, supra note 139, § 5.9, at 99-100.
215. See McGuire v. Mosley Rogers Title Co., 997 So. 2d 23, 28 (La. App.
2d Cir. 2008), writ denied, 999 So. 2d 757 (La. 2009).
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though, is that this remedy will alter the current classification of
some rights. Time limitations that are currently considered
peremptive without being explicitly described as such will, under
this solution, be considered prescriptive.
216
That this solution changes how some rights are classified mLr
be troublesome. Stability in the law is a desirable outcome,
particularly when that stability pertains to when suit may be filed.
In contemplating the degree to which the current classification of
rights should be changed, the legislature must examine two issues:
first, which rights should be affected by this new classification and,
second, how those rights should be affected. In response to the first
issue, the legislature should decide if it wants the new rule to affect
all rights or only those rights created after the implementation of
the proposed article.21 8 The benefit of only changing newly created
rights is that there will be no alteration in the manner in which
existing rights are classified. The downside to this limited
application is that it will perpetuate the confusion surrounding
current rights, the very problem this solution strives to ameliorate.
If the legislature decides to apply the new rule to already-
created rights, then the legislature will have to address the
temporal application of the new rule. Namely, the legislature
should determine if the new rule will be applied prospectively or
retrospectively. If applied only prospectively, then the new article
216. For example, it is currently unknown if the time period attached to a
right to bring a private action under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law is peremptive; some cases hold that the right is subject to
peremption, but the Louisiana Supreme Court failed to address the issue in a
recent case on the matter. See, e.g., Miller v. ConAgra, Inc., 991 So. 2d 445,
455-57 (La. 2008); Glod v. Baker, 899 So. 2d 642, 647-48 (La. App. 3d Cir.
2005), writ denied, 920 So. 2d 238 (La. 2006); Canal Marine Supply, Inc. v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 522 So. 2d 1201, 1203 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988). If the
right is deemed to be prescriptive, passage of the proposed article would change
the classification of the right because the word "perempt" (or any variation
thereoo is not used in the text of the statute. Similarly, if the right to annul a
judgment is currently considered peremptive, this article would alter that
classification. See supra note 171 for cases holding that the right to annul a
judgment is subject to peremption. The right to annul a judgment only uses the
word "peremption" in the title of the article. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art.
2004 (2003). This suggested legislative change requires that the word
"peremption" be expressly used in the text of the actual legislation.
217. "[The] casual change from existing laws to new and different ones
weakens the power of law itself." ARISTOTLE, POLrIcS 49 (C.D.C. Reeve trans.,
Hackett Pub. Co. 1998).
218. Determining which rights should be affected has been a long-standing
issue for lawmakers. In 491, Emperor Anastasius opted to only change newly
created time limitations when he changed the length of prescription from thirty




will not govern cases arising from factual scenarios occurring
before its passage. This means that for at least a few years
following its enactment, the new article will not govern all
cases. 219 On the other hand, if the legislature wants the new article
to apply retrospectively, then the legislature must include in its
drafting a clear "legislative expression" that the article should be
applied retrospectively. 220 Even with a clear legislative expression,
though, the legislature will be constitutionally limited in the
retrospective application of the new rule, as the legislature cannot
deny individuals vested rights. 22 1 Creditors whose rights are
changed in classification from peremptive to prescriptive will have
greater rights because prescription, unlike peremption, may be
interrupted, suspended, and renounced. This may cause the time
period in which a creditor can sue his debtor to be extended. As
creditors' rights increase, their debtors' rights decrease. Therefore,
any vested right a debtor has regarding a claim that has been
perempted cannot be altered by the passage of the proposed article.
Given these difficult issues of when and how the proposed article
should be applied, there may be merit to developing a solution that
works within the current confines of the doctrine of peremption
without changing the characterization of already-determined rights.
B. Give Guidance in the Civil Code
An alternative legislative remedy that would not change
already-classified time periods is to provide specific guidance in
the Civil Code regarding how to distinguish peremption and
prescription.222 If the directions were clear and meaningful, it
would not only end the courts' current confusion, but also would
relieve the legislature from having to include in every statute the
statement "this time period is peremptive" or "this time period is
prescriptive" to ensure that its intent is followed; courts should be
able to deduce the correct classification from the guidance
provided within the Civil Code.
219. The issue of prospective or retrospective application of law has been
discussed with regard to the changes made to the filiation rules in 2005. E.g.,
Succession of McKay, 921 So. 2d 1219 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006) (holding that
the new filiation time periods could not be applied retrospectively because the
time periods altered substantive rights), writ denied, 929 So. 2d 1252 (La. 2006).
220. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 6 (1999).
221. See id. cmt. b. The constitutionality of applying new time periods to
existing rights has also been discussed with regard to the amended filiation
articles. See W.R.M. v. H.C.V., 951 So. 2d 172 (La. 2007).
222. Scholars have long called for such an addition. See Dainow, supra note
62, at 132; Shuey, supra note 55, at 249.
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There are great disadvantages to this solution. Like the
previous remedy, the problem of inequities remains ignored. The
solution also does not attempt to fix the current misapplications of
peremption. Moreover, this solution provides courts more
flexibility in determining if a limitation is peremptive or
prescriptive because strict rules are not provided.223 The more
flexibility left to courts, the more uncertainty will remain
surrounding the delineation of the doctrines.
The biggest hurdle for this solution, however, is its actual
implementation. Devising a test that determines whether a time
period is peremptive has been difficult since the creation of the
doctrine. Louisiana courts have battled this issue for almost a
century with relatively little success. 224 French scholars BaudrA-
Lacantinerie and Tissier described such attempts as "impossible.
Executing this solution will, at a minimum, be an uphill battle. Part
of the reason why this undertaking is difficult is because it is
unclear what exactly such a test should include. Presumably the
test should be based on the factors on which the courts currently
rely.226 Using these factors, the focus should be on the text of the
statute and the legislative intent behind the stated time period.
227
But if the focus of the legislative guidance is the text of the
legislation and the legislative intent, then such a test is superfluous
because it simply amounts to a specific application of the methods
of statutory interpretation already provided in the Civil Code.
22 8
Civil Code article 9 provides that if the law is clear and
223. This presumes that the guidance given is not a bright-line rule, but a
subjective analytical framework. If a bright-line rule is provided, then there
would be little flexibility for courts in determining whether a limitation is
peremptive or prescriptive. However, any bright-line rule will run into the same
problems of application that the first solution-requiring the legislature to
expressly state that a period is peremptive-encounters. See supra Part III.A.
Almost necessarily, a bright-line rule will alter the classification of some
currently existing rights; thus, the question of how and when the rule should
apply will arise.
224. See supra Part II.A.
225. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 29, no. 40, at 30.
226. See supra Part II.C. for a discussion of the factors that courts currently
use to determine whether a time period is peremptive.
227. See State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso, 842 So. 2d 346, 349 (La. 2003); State
v. McInnis Bros. Constr., 701 So. 2d 937, 940 (La. 1997); Metro. Erection Co.
v. Landis Constr., 627 So. 2d 144, 147 (La. 1993); Pounds v. Schori, 377 So. 2d
1195, 1199-1200 (La. 1979); Conerly v. State ex rel. La. State Penitentiary, 858
So. 2d 636, 642-43 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2003), writ denied, 858 So. 2d 432 (La.
2003).
228. See LA. Civ. CODE AIN. arts. 9-13 (1999).
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unambiguous, it should be applied as written;229 courts have stated
that when the text of the statute clearly indicates that the statute is
peremptive, no further analysis is needed.23 ° Civil Code article 10
provides that when the text of the statute is subject to different
interpretations, the purpose of the legislation should be
examined; 231 when the text of the statute is not abundantly clear,
courts have looked at the purpose behind the statute and whether
the intent of the legislature was to extinguish the right or merely to
bar the right.
232
No court has expressly noted the similarity between the
interpretive factors that courts employ and the general methods of
interpretation already provided in the Civil Code,2 33 but it is
inarguable that the two mirror one another. That being the case,
why a specific test is needed in the peremption context is
questionable. More importantly, it is unclear what a specific test
based on the factors that courts currently utilize would add to the
methods of interpretation already established. Perhaps the most
practical addition that could be made to help guide the courts
would be to add a new comment to the article defining peremption
that states: "To determine if legislation setting forth a time
limitation establishes a prescriptive or peremptive period, courts
should use the methods of interpreting laws provided in Book I,
Chapter 2." This proposed comment, though perhaps self-evident,
would remind courts that there are five articles in the Louisiana
Civil Code234 and eighteen Revised Statutes 235 dedicated to
directing the interpretation of legislation.
229. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (1999). This textual method of interpretation
is also reflected in the Revised Statutes. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1:3-:4
(2003).
230. Metro. Erection Co., 627 So. 2d at 147; St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v.
GAF Corp., 512 So. 2d 1165, 1169 (La. 1987).
231. LA. CIV. CODEANN. art. 10(1999).
232. Ourso, 842 So. 2d at 349; Mclnnis Bros. Constr., 701 So. 2d at 940;
Metro. Erection Co., 627 So. at 147; Pounds, 377 So. 2d at 1199-1200; Conerly,
858 So. 2d at 642-43.
233. In Teague, the majority noted that it was "bound to apply the exception
[of peremption] provided by law as clearly and unambiguously written by the
Legislature," citing Civil Code article 9 for support. Teague v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 974 So. 2d 1266, 1275 n.4 (La. 2008). After making this
observation, the Teague court went on to deviate from the words in the statute
and shift when peremption begins. Id. at 1277-78.
234. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 9-13 (1999).
235. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 1:1-:17 (2003).
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C. Create Equitable Exceptions
The two aforementioned solutions operate on the premise that
confusion between peremption and prescription is the primary
problem. The remedies strive solely to end (or decrease) that
confusion; they do not address the "perceived inequities" in
peremption236 or the misapplications of the doctrine that result
from those inequities.237 By their very nature, they cannot. The
best method of ending the current confusion is to propose strict,
bright-line rules that clearly establish when peremption is to be
applied. But for every non-malleable rule that is imposed, there
exists a set of facts in which the application of that rule leads to an
unjust result. When piecemeal, equitable exceptions are crafted for
the rules of peremption (as courts have regularly done), the clarity
that the bright-line rule strives to achieve is lost.
If, instead of confusion, inequity is seen as the primary
problem with peremption, then a different solution must be
developed. The inequity primarily recognized by courts and the
legislature is the peremption of a claimant's right before he is able
to act on that right either because he is unaware that the right
exists 23 or because he is incapable of exercising the right due to
circumstances beyond his control. 239 To remedy this unfairness, the
solution must allow equitable exceptions to the general rule that
peremption cannot be interrupted, suspended, or renounced. By
doing this, courts can prevent the running of peremption while the
claimant is unable to exercise the cause of action.
A rule that would alleviate these inequities could be crafted by
amending current Civil Code article 3461 to say: "Peremption may
not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended except as may be
236. This is not to say that the above rules do not end any inequities. Treating
claimants differently, i.e., strictly applying the peremption period to claimant A
but allowing claimant B to have peremption equitably suspended, can also be
viewed as an inequity in the law. However, when the courts have referred to the
inequities of peremption, the reference has been made with regard to claimants'
right to sue being extinguished before the right is realized. E.g., Reeder v. North,
701 So. 2d 1291, 1296 (La. 1997); Biggers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 1179,
1183 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2004); Raby-Magee v. Matzen, 764 So. 2d 978, 979 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 2000); Drennan v. Killian, 712 So. 2d 978, 980 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1998).
237. See supra Parts II.A & II.B.
238. See, e.g., Reeder, 701 So. 2d 1291; Biggers, 886 So. 2d 1179; Drennan,
712 So. 2d 978.
239. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5824 (2007); Leger v. Weinstein,
885 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004), writ denied, 893 So. 2d 873 (La. 2005).
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required to achieve equity."240 This alteration essentially provides
that the general rule set forth in Civil Code article 4-that the law
should not lead to inequitable results-applies to peremption.
241
For example, if not allowing peremption to be suspended leads to
the destruction of the claimant's right before he knows of its
existence, then the court could decide that such a result is
inequitable, not apply the rule of peremption, and remain within
the letter of the new law. Similarly, if a claimant is unable to
exercise his right during the peremptive period and after the
running of the period a defendant renounces his right, a court could
find that permitting the renunciation is fair to both parties and
disregard the general rule that peremption is not subject to
renunciation.
This solution, like the other remedies offered, has troubles of
its own, the primary one being that it does not help to distinguish
peremption and prescription. In fact, if anything, this solution will
likely increase confusion because it prompts a new question: what
is equity? Equity, as described in article 4 of the Civil Code, refers
to "justice, reason, and prevailing usages., 2 42 By allowing equity to
circumvent the general rule that peremptive periods may not be
interrupted, suspended, or renounced, courts will still be faced with
deciding whether a right is subject to peremption or prescription.
After answering that question, courts will then have to determine if
applying the peremptive period will lead to an inequitable result.
Answering both questions will increase the lack of uniformity in
results regarding when a claimant can bring his claim.
Even if equity could be adequately defined for the purposes of
peremption, there is a second problem with this solution.
Encouraging courts to decide whether a claim is subject to
peremption based on equity goes against the very purpose that
equity is intended to serve in the Civil Code. Equity is to be
resorted to only "in the absence of a positive law or custom. ' 243 It
240. The text that the author proposes to add to the current version of Civil
Code article 3461 is italicized.
241. See LA. CIrv. CODE ANN. art. 4 (1999).
242. Id. Equity is also defined in the Civil Code in reference to how doubtful
provisions of contracts should be interpreted. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2053
(2008). Article 2055 of the Civil Code refers to equity as "the principle[] that no
one is allowed to take unfair advantage of another and that no one is allowed to
enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another." LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
2055 (2008). This definition, though arguably more functional than the
description of equity provided in Civil Code article 4, does not adequately
describe the type of inequity that courts lament when discussing the "perceived
inequities" of peremption.
243. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative
Essay, 78 TuL. L. REv. 379, 394 (2003).
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is intended to be used to fill gaps within the law, not to create
law.244 Allowing peremptive periods to be altered at the court's
discretion in essence allows courts to use equity to deviate from
the legislature's intent in creating a peremptive period. When it
creates a preemptive period, the legislature is aware of the effect of
such a classification. When the legal malpractice statute was
debated, for example, the subject of peremption arose and was
opposed by some organizations "because it could extinguish a
cause of action before it arises. 245 These "pitfalls" of peremption
were well articulated before the legislature, but the legislature still
opted to subject actions for legal malpractice to peremption. 246
Applying equity to a statute like the legal malpractice statute
would not be filling in a gap in the law; it would be creating law,
and, more particularly, it would be creating law directly in
opposition to that which was passed by the legislature.
Legislative intent aside, there is an even greater problem with
the above solution: it destroys the foundation of the doctrine of
peremption. By definition, a right that is subject to a peremptive
period exists only for a limited amount of time.247 At the end of the
time period, the right is destroyed. To allow the time period to be
interrupted or suspended would change the nature of the right
because the right would no longer be finite; the right would be
infinite so long as equity required.248 While allowing peremptive
periods to be interrupted, suspended, or renounced may rid the
system of some inequity, its effects are much broader because the
remedy destroys the underlying notion of peremption.
D. Extinguish Peremption
If allowing for equitable deviations from peremption or
defining what rights are peremptive does not solve all problems,
perhaps there is another solution: eliminate peremption. Destroying
the doctrine of peremption would mean no more confusion
between peremption and prescription because peremption would
244. E.g., Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Remnant of Forced Heirship: The
Interrelationship of Undue Influence, What's Become of Disinherison, and the
Unfinished Business of the Stepparent Usufruct, 60 LA. L. REv. 637, 657 n.113(2000).
245. Reeder v. North, 701 So. 2d 1291, 1297 (La. 1997).
246. Id.
247. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3458 (2007).
248. H. Alston Johnson III, Death on the Callis Coach: The Mystery of
Louisiana Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 37 LA. L. REv. 1, 36-41 (1976)
("A period that admits of suspension or interruption cannot properly be called a
peremptive period." (emphasis omitted)).
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no longer exist; the only type of temporal limitations would be
prescriptive limitations. Inequities created by peremption would
cease. The misapplications of peremption would stop. The
problems discussed herein would largely be solved. The removal
of an entire doctrine from Louisiana law may at first blush seem
extreme, though, in reality, it is not the first time such a solution
has been proposed. Aubry and Rau questioned the doctrine of
forfeitures years ago, stating that "[t]he fact that the time period
limits the exercise of a faculty rather than extinguishes upon its
expiration an action or a right, does not justify a different
regime." 2
49
This solution, however, comes at a high price. First, to truly
enact this remedy, peremption would have to be deleted from the
vocabulary of all Louisiana legislation. There are currently sixty-
eight legislative provisions in the Civil Code, 250  Revised
249. AUBRY & RAU, supra note 32, § 771, at 422.
250. The following fourteen Civil Code articles would need to be revised in
order to extinguish peremption from Louisiana law: LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
117 (1999) (establishing a three-year peremptive period to claim spousal
support); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 186 (2007) (establishing a one-year
peremptive period for the disavowal of paternity by the second husband
presumed to the father of the child); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193 (2007)
(establishing a peremptive period for a mother to contest paternity of 180 days
from the marriage of her husband and two years from the birth of the child); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 195 (2007) (establishing a 180-day peremptive period for
the disavowal of paternity by the formally acknowledged father); LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. art. 197 (2007) (establishing a one-year peremptive period for a child to
establish paternity for the purposes of successions); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 198
(2007) (establishing one- and ten-year peremptive periods for a father to
establish paternity when the child is filiated to another man); LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 2571 (2005) (stating that peremption runs against all persons including
minors); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2595 (2005) (establishing a one-year
peremptive period for lesion); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3458 (2007) (defining
peremption); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3459 (2007) (providing that the rules for
computing time under prescription apply to peremption); LA. Crv. CODE ANN.
art. 3460 (2007) (providing that peremption need not be pleaded); LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 3461 (2007) (providing that peremption may not be renounced,
interrupted, or suspected); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3496.1 (1994) (providing
that the action against a person for abuse of a minor is subject to any peremption
period provided by law); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3549 (Supp. 2008) (providing
the conflicts of law rules concerning prescription and peremption). Additionally,
the comments of two Civil Code articles discuss peremption, though the text of
the articles does not. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 112 cmt. j (1999) (discussing the
peremptive period of Civil Code art. 117); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 cmt. a
(2007) (discussing the peremptive period of a disavowal action). For the sake of
clarity, an Editor's Note should be added to these articles to specify that
peremption has been extinguished.
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Statutes, 251 and Code of Civil Procedure252 that use the word
peremption or a variation thereof.253 All of this legislation would
251. The following fifty-one Revised Statutes would need to be changed in
order to truly extinguish peremption from Louisiana law: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
6:293 (2005) (establishing one-, two-, three-, and four-year peremptive periods
for actions against directors and officers of banks and bank holding companies);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:787 (2005) (establishing one-, three-, and four-year
peremptive periods for actions against directors and officers of financial
institutions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:1191 (2005) (establishing one-, two-,
three-, and four-year peremptive periods for actions against directors and
officers of savings banks); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:404 (2008) (referring to the
peremptive periods for a father's paternity action); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:1109 (2008) (statutes shall not be construed as validating, by reason of
prescription or peremption, any transfer of navigable waters or beds); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:1123.115 (2008 & Supp. 2010) (establishing a one-year
peremptive period for privileges on immovables); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1147
(2008) (establishing a five-year peremptive period for privileges against lots of
association of owners in a residential or commercial subdivision); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2234 (2005) (establishing two- and three-year peremptive
periods for actions for damages against a trustee); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2503
(2005) (establishing a one-year peremptive period for an action to annul an
alienation, lease, or encumbrance owned by a decedent at his death); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2772 (2005) (establishing six-month and five-year peremptive
periods for actions involving deficiencies in surveying, design, supervision, or
construction of immovables or improvements thereon); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2800.8 (1997) (referring to the peremptive periods applicable to property
adjudicated to local governmental subdivisions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2800.9 (1997) (referring to periods of peremption affecting actions against a
person for abuse of a minor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12 (Supp. 2008)
(establishing three- and ten-year peremptive periods for liability for performing
an abortion); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3146 (Supp. 2008) (establishing a thirty-
day peremptive period for enforcing warranties under the New Home Warranties
Act); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3150 (Supp. 2008) (establishing that the New
Home Warranties Act provides the exclusive peremptive periods as between
builders and owners for home construction); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5014
(2007) (referring to the peremption of inscription against owners of immovables
and heirs and legatees who have accepted a succession); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:5015 (2007) (establishing a three-month peremptive period for the inscription
of the privilege of a succession creditor or particular legatee); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:5016 (2007) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5604 (2007)
(establishing one- and three-year peremptive periods for actions against
professional accountants); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5605 (2007) (establishing
one- and three-year peremptive periods for actions for legal malpractice); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5606 (2007) (establishing one-and three-year peremptive
periods for actions for professional insurance agent liability); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:5607 (2007) (establishing a five-year peremptive period for actions
against a professional engineer, surveyor, professional interior designer,
architect, or real estate developer); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5609 (2007)
(establishing the "peremption of the effect of recordation" of contracts to buy or
sell immovables); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628.1 (2007) (providing one- and
three-year peremptive periods for actions against healthcare providers arising
from the use of blood or tissue); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5822 (2007)
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(providing for the suspension and extension of all peremptive periods in the
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5824 (2007)
(same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:147 (1994) (entitling the procedural time
limits that affect claims against corporations in liquidation as peremptive); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:255 (1994) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1338
(1994) (entitling the procedural time limits that affect claims against limited
liability companies in liquidation as peremptive); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:5108 (2006) (establishing a one-year peremptive period for filing suit in
contract for injury to person or property against the state, state agencies, and
political subdivisions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5122 (2006) (modifying the
laws for suits affecting the validity of bonds, but providing that nothing in the
modified laws affects any peremptive or prescriptive period for the contesting of
bonds of governmental units); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.11 (Supp. 2008)
(establishing a ninety-day peremptive period for petitioning review of a denial
of a revocation of a parole hearing); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:175 (Supp. 2008)
(establishing a thirty-day peremptive period for attacking municipal ordinances);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4100 (2002) (establishing a thirty-day peremptive
period for actions contesting the validity of New Orleans bond issues); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33:4128 (2002) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4141 (2002)
(same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4720.60.1 (2009) (establishing a one-year
peremptive period for annulling an expedited quiet title or foreclosure action);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:816 (2006) (establishing a one-year peremptive
period to seize a vessel held liable for injuries to persons or property); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 34:3112.1 (2006) (establishing a thirty-day peremptive period for
contesting the legality of a resolution authorizing revenue bonds); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 34:3483 (2006) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:3503 (Supp.
2010) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35:200 (2006) (establishing one-and three-
year peremptive periods for actions for damages against a notary); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:92 (2007) (establishing that all peremptive periods of
accountants must be governed by LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5604 (2007)); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1041 (2005) (establishing a thirty-day peremptive period
for contesting the legality of a resolution authorizing the issuance of bonds by
the city of New Orleans); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1451 (2005) (establishing a
thirty-day peremptive period for contesting the legality of a resolution or
ordinance authorizing the issuance of refunding bonds); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
47:2241 (2009) (stating that all redemptive periods in the Louisiana Constitution
are peremptive); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6006.1 (Supp. 2008) (stating that
nothing in the revised statutes regarding tax credits for taxes paid with respect to
vessels in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Waters affects peremptive
periods that may apply under the Louisiana Constitution); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 48:27 (2004) (establishing a thirty-day peremptive period for contesting the
legality of a resolution adopted by the State Bond Commission under the Grant
Anticipation Revenue Vehicle Act of 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1158.1
(2003) (establishing a thirty-day peremptive period for contesting a resolution
authorizing the issuance of bonds by a corporation or a lease, with the thirty-day
period commencing on the date the resolution is published in the appropriate
newspaper); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1605 (2003) (establishing a thirty-day
peremptive period for contesting the legality of a revenue bond authorized by
the Secretary of Natural Resources). Additionally, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
47:2133 cmt. c (2009) discusses peremption. For the sake of clarity, an Editor's
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need to be amended in order to remove peremption from Louisiana
law.254 Though tedious and time consuming to do, this hurdle
could be overcome.
The second concern with extinguishing peremption is that there
may be a need for the doctrine. There may arguably be some rights
of debtors that society values so much that it truly believes the
rights of the creditor should be destroyed if not exercised
promptly. By deleting peremption, the legislature could lose its
ability to govern these rights that the public has an interest in
seeing exist only for a limited amount of time.
This second concern is unfounded. The authority of the
legislature to provide an absolute protection of the rights of the
debtor is not entirely thwarted by deleting peremption. The
legislature may opt to create a prescriptive period that cannot be
suspended, interrupted, or renounced. The only difference is that
without the doctrine of peremption, the legislature must explicitly
state that a particular time period provided by law is not subject to
interruption, suspension, or renunciation, as provided in Civil Code
articles 3462 through 3472, and is not subject to the judicially-
Note should be added to this statute to specify that peremption has been
extinguished.
252. The following three articles in the Code of Civil Procedure would need
to be changed in order to truly extinguish peremption from Louisiana law. LA.
CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 927 (Supp. 2010) (establishing peremption as a
peremptory exception); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1067 (2005) (providing
when an incidental demand is not barred by peremption); LA. CODE CwV. PROC.
ANN. art. 2004 (2003) (entitling the period for annulling a judgment as
peremptive).
253. Though some provisions have been interpreted to be peremptive, the use
of peremption does not occur in the Louisiana Children's Code, the Louisiana
Code of Evidence, the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana Constitution
Ancillaries, or the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.
254. A statute that explicitly states that peremption no longer exists in
Louisiana may also need to be enacted. Though such a provision would be
inartful, it may be necessary in order to ensure that courts do not apply
peremption to legislatively provided time periods that do not expressly use the
term "peremption." The eradication of peremption from sixty-eight legislative
provisions should be enough to show the legislature's clear intent to rid
Louisiana of the doctrine, but the fact remains that peremption existed
jurisprudentially before it existed statutorily. As such, courts may reason that
legislation is not necessary to apply peremption to time limitations. To avoid
such a conclusion, the legislature would be wise to include legislation in the




created suspensions provided under the doctrine of contra non
valentem.255
Admittedly, the judicial and legislative efficiency of deleting
peremption seems questionable if it will simply lead to the
alteration of sixty-eight pieces of legislation by deleting the word
"peremption" (or "perempt," "peremptive," etc.) and then adding a
sentence to the formerly peremptive statutes that says the
prescriptive period provided may not be interrupted, suspended, or
renounced. There are, however, advantages to this approach. By
requiring the legislature to state the exact characteristics of
prescription that should not apply to particular time limitations, the
legislature may be more inclined to tailor each prescriptive period
to the individual action. For example, there may be valid reasons
why an action for legal malpractice should not be interrupted or
suspended, but there seems to be little reason for not allowing the
action to be renounced or for not requiring the negligent attorney
to plead the exception himself. Forcing the legislature to explicitly
state which prescriptive rules are not to be applied will increase the
likelihood that the legislature will consider the specific effects of
each rule of prescription and how those rules should apply to
individual time periods.
There is, though, a broader reason why peremption should be
extinguished: it does not actually fulfill its purpose of protecting
underlying public interests.256 The reason that peremption does not
always protect public policy is because peremptive periods are
established ex ante and make no room for alteration ex post. To
truly serve as a defender of societal values, courts must be able to
examine the situation and determine what the best protective
method is based on the facts at hand. Such determinations should
certainly be guided by legislation, but having rules as hard-and-fast
as peremptive periods means that some public policies that society
believes are important will fall on the wrong side of the peremptive
line. In such situations, the public policy that peremption purports
to protect may actually be harmed by the doctrine.
This problem with peremption is particularly prevalent when
peremption pits public policies against one another. At least one
example of such a situation exists within the laws of filiation and
successions. The rules of filiation strive to promote family stability
255. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently recognized the legislature's
ability to modify the general rules of prescription. In Warren v. Louisiana
Medical Mutual Insurance Co., the court held that the Medical Malpractice Act
provides the exclusive means of interrupting and suspending prescription, such
that the general Civil Code articles on interruption and suspension do not apply.
No. 2007-CC-0492, 2009 La. LEXIS 2224, at *15-19 (La. June 26, 2009).
256. See Hebert v. Doctors Mem'l Hosp., 486 So. 2d 717, 722 (La. 1986).
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and protect children from an "upheaval of [filiation] litigation.' 257
In successions, requiring certain heirs to claim their succession
rights within a relatively short period of time promotes the "orderly
disposition of estates," 258 which leads to "the stability of land
titles. 259 Inarguably, both stability of family and stability of title
are important values for society to protect.
Peremption, however, causes these values to collide. A child's
action to establish paternity is subject to a one-year peremtive
period that commences upon the death of the alleged father.Z60 In
other words, one year after the biological father dies, the child's
right to filiate for the purposes of inheriting from him also dies.
Suppose an unmarried mother and father conceive a child and the
father never takes the requisite steps to filiate. On the child's
fourteenth birthday on January 1, 2005, the father abruptly leaves
the mother and child. The mother and child search for the father
until January 1, 2009, when they discover that the father died
intestate two years earlier on January 1, 2007. At this point, the
child has no opportunity to inherit from her biological father
because she is perempted from establishing paternity for the
purposes of the succession. In this scenario, the public policy of
protecting children is diametrically opposed to the public policy of
protecting title. Allowing the child to inherit from the father would
likely be in the best interest of the child. Not allowing the child to
inherit from the father protects third parties who have acquired an
interest in the father's estate.
And therein lies the problem with peremption. In some
scenarios it would be in the best interest of society if the court
favored the protection of children and allowed the child to filiate.
In other scenarios, it would be better for society if the court did not
allow the child to filiate and instead protected the stability of title.
The problem with peremption is that the doctrine ties the court's
hands such that it cannot (or at least should not) consider what the
more important public policy is in an individual situation. 261 Some
of society's beloved values are left vulnerable by the doctrine, and
257. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 186, 193, 195, 197, 198 (2007); Spaht, supra
note 119, at 324.
258. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. e (2007); see also Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977) (noting the importance of"[t]he orderly disposition of
property at death").
259. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. e (2007).
260. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 197 (2007).
261. This is not to say that declaring all rights prescriptive will solve all
problems; admittedly, the doctrine of prescription has its own limitations. This
hypothetical merely establishes that peremption does not always fulfill its
purpose of protecting public policy.
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yet protecting public policy is one of the main goals of peremption.
Given that peremption cannot serve its very purpose, the problems
of inequity, misapplication, and confusion that the doctrine creates
are not worth their trouble; peremption should be extinguished
from Louisiana law.
CONCLUSION
How the passage of time affects legal rights should be clear,
but instead, we find ourselves buried under temporal ambiguity.
Much of this ambiguity arises from the doctrine of peremption.
Peremption has been problematic in Louisiana because it
inherently leads to inequitable results that courts and legislators
attempt to remedy. Such remedies create further problems because
they misapply the doctrine of peremption by allowing non-
peremptive rules to affect peremptive periods. These
misapplications foster confusion in determining when a time
limitation is peremptive. As confusion increases, courts and the
legislature attempt to clarify how a particular right should be
classified. Once a court or the legislature is successful in clarifying
that a right is subject to peremption, the original problem of
inequity returns. The problems of peremption abound.
These problems might be well worth their trouble if the
doctrine of peremption achieved its goal of protecting public
policy. The fact of the matter is, though, that peremption
frequently fails in this regard. Because peremption provides non-
malleable, ex-ante rules, the doctrine finds itself working against
some of the very values it purports to protect. As peremption
creates a host of problems without achieving its goal, the doctrine
of peremption should be extinguished from Louisiana law. When
the legislature takes action to ameliorate this current situation, it
should also reflect upon the much broader, more utilized temporal
doctrine of prescription, for if peremption is this problematic, what
issues lurk within prescription?
2010] 1225

